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Abstract 
 
The thesis uses empirical tools to investigate causal effects in labor economics and politics.  
The first chapter analyzes the effects of commercial television in Norway. Matching data on 
cable television networks with individual-level administrative register data, we find that the 
expansion of commercial television reduced ability test scores as well as high school 
graduation rates. We find stronger effects on sons of low-income parents and particularly 
large effect for children in elementary school. Aggregate data show a substantial drop in time 
spent reading by young people in the same period, suggesting that television watching may 
have crowded out more cognitively stimulating activities such as reading. This chapter is joint 
work with Simen Markussen and Knut Røed.  
The second chapter investigates how sickness absence behavior in Norwegian municipalities 
was affected by the terrorist attack in Norway on July 22, 2011. Using register data covering 
the complete Norwegian population, I find that sickness absence rates declined substantially 
in municipalities affected more intensely by the attack. In municipalities from which a 
resident was killed in the attack, sickness absence rates declined by 4 % compared to 
municipalities without victims. The effect is precisely estimated, stable across several 
challenging specifications, and persists for as long as there is available data. The effect for 
people in their 20's is more than twice that for the population at large -- for this group, local 
exposure to the attack decreased absence rates by around 10 %.  
The third chapter exploits a natural experiment in the Norwegian political system. I find that 
obtaining the right to vote at a lower age is associated with substantially higher turnout among 
first-time voters, and that this is driven by parental influence. Counter to conventional wisdom 
about the habitual nature of voting, this difference in political participation does not persist for 
subsequent elections. 
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Abstract 
 We exploit heterogeneity in the growth of commercial television across 
Norwegian municipalities to estimate the effect of television coverage on 
standardized ability (intelligence) test scores and early career outcomes of 
young men. Matching a dataset containing the universe of Norwegian cable 
television networks up to 2004 with individual-level administrative register data, 
we find that the expansion of commercial television reduced ability test scores 
as well as high school graduation rates, and increased the probability of 
receiving disability benefits. Our results indicate that one year of living in a 
municipality with full coverage of cable television during childhood and 
adolescence lowers ability test scores of young men by 0.75 % of a standard 
deviation, corresponding to around 0.1 IQ points. Although television has 
negative effects on cognitive ability at all ages, the effect is larger for children 
in elementary school. Aggregate data show that this period coincided with a 
substantial drop in time spent reading by young people, suggesting that 
television watching may have crowded out more cognitively stimulating 
activities such as reading.  
 
Keywords: Human capital, Media  
JEL Classification: J13, J24, L82  
                                                 
1 This paper is part of the project “Social Insurance and Labor Market Inclusion in Norway”, funded by the 
Norwegian Research Council (grant #202513). Administrative registers made available by Statistics Norway 
have been essential. Data on ability scores have been obtained by consent from the Norwegian Armed 
Forces, who are not responsible for any of the findings and conclusions reported in the paper. 
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 1  Introduction  
Since television began to be introduced to a large audience around the mid-20th century, its 
effects have been debated. The concern has largely been that television encourages a 
particularly passive form of engagement, and thus may be damaging to intellectual 
development. This view has been argued by social commentators (e.g. Postman (1985)), but 
has also received support in professional circles: American pediatricians have concluded that 
television affects children’s cognitive abilities negatively (American Academy of Pediatrics 
(2001)). The complete opposite view has also found supporters: Johnson (2006) argues that 
popular culture, including television, has become more complex and intellectually demanding 
over time and that this gives beneficial cognitive payoffs.  
Cognitive skills are essential factors underlying individual (Griliches and Mason, 1972; 
Cunha and Heckman, 2007) and aggregate economic outcomes (Hanushek and Woessmann, 
2008). Since its introduction, television has spread all over the world, hence its effects are also 
likely to be ubiquitous. If television viewing is indeed harmful to the development of cognitive 
skills, that is critical knowledge for policy makers and families alike. In this paper, we 
examine how a geographically staggered expansion of access to commercial cable television 
in Norway affected children’s cognitive skill developments and early career outcomes. We 
provide empirical support for the view that commercial cable television indeed has negative 
effects on cognitive skills – as measured by intelligence test scores at time of military service 
enrolment – and that it also reduces high-school completion rates. In addition, we find 
indications that a large supply of commercial television during childhood raises the probability 
of becoming a disability benefit claimant later on. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is 
the first to analyze the effects of television on later long term educational and labor market 
outcomes  
When television was deregulated in Norway in the beginning of the 1980’s, it became 
legal to forward television signals broadcast by satellites in local cable networks, and a large 
roll-out of cable networks was initiated. We argue that the growth in cable networks was a 
supply-led development driven by geographical factors and settlement patterns. To account for 
unobservable factors possibly related to both television adoption and outcomes, we include 
municipality fixed effects and county-year fixed effects and time-varying socio-economic 
variables at the municipality level in our regressions. Further, due to the richness of our data, 
we are able to control for relevant parental characteristics in order to improve precision, 
account for possible selection, and specify treatment interactions.  
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 We match a dataset containing the universe of Norwegian cable television networks at the 
municipality level up to 2004 with comprehensive individual-level administrative register data. 
Our outcomes of interest are standardized ability (intelligence) test scores and early 
educational and labor market outcomes of the male Norwegian population.  
Our results indicate that one year of living in a municipality with full coverage of cable 
television during childhood and adolescence lowers ability test scores of young men by 0.75 % 
standard deviations, corresponding to 0.11 IQ points. It reduces the high-school completion 
rate by a little less than half a percentage point. We hypothesize that these effects may be 
driven by consumption of television crowding out more cognitively stimulating activities such 
as reading, in which there was a substantial, aggregate drop in the same period.  
2  Literature  
The pediatrics literature has documented a negative association between television viewing 
and a wide range of health outcomes (Strasburger et al., 2010). Jolin and Weller (2011) lament 
the lack of longitudinal research designs, but conclude that current research suggests that 
television viewing has negative effects. A review of short-term experimental studies reports 
mixed results of television content, though more fundamentally raises the concern about the 
external validity of such studies (Thakkar et al., 2006). 
The last decade has seen a rapidly growing literature in economics on the effects of media. 
Television in particular has been found to impact outcomes as diverse as voter turnout in the 
US (Gentzkow, 2006), party choice in the US and Russia (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; 
Enikolopov et al., 2011; Martin and Yurukoglu, 2014), social capital in Indonesia (Olken, 
2009), fertility, women’s status and school enrollment in India (Jensen and Oster, 2009), and 
divorce and fertility in Brazil (Chong and Ferrara, 2009; La Ferrara et al., 2012).  
The study most closely related to ours is Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008), who analyze the 
effect of the introduction of television in the US in the 1940’s and 50’s on standardized test 
scores. They find that contrary to many worries, television exposure during pre-school age not 
only did not lower test scores, but in fact raised reading and general knowledge scores for 
socially disadvantaged groups. On the basis of this effect heterogeneity, they conclude that 
“the cognitive effects of television exposure depend critically on the educational value of the 
alternative activities that it crowds out (p. 282).” This makes it pertinent to reexamine the issue, 
since most societies have undergone large changes in their educational and home 
environments since the early post-war era and one may suspect that TV is crowding out more 
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 valuable activities today. We also complement their study in that we are able to analyze effects 
at different ages and on longer-term outcomes. 
Earlier research has identified a decline in average test scores during the 1990’s (Sundet 
et al., 2004). As shown in Figure 1, our own data confirm this development, and also indicate 
that the negative trend has continued after the turn of the century. In light of the evidence 
suggesting negative effects of television, one explanation may be the growth in commercial 
cable television.  
 
Figure 1. IQ of Norwegian conscripts 1990-2008. The test was normed on the test cohort of 
1954, which provides the reference point (i.e. 1954 mean = 100).   
 
3  Data and institutional setting 
3.1  Cable television in Norway 
Television was introduced in Norway in the 1960’s. Until 1981, the state-controlled 
Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation held a legal monopoly on broadcasting in the country, 
and for most Norwegians, only a single TV-channel was available. In December 1981, the 
newly elected government announced that 30 other agents would obtain broadcasting licenses 
the following year, thereby breaking the public monopoly. It then became legal to forward 
television signals broadcast by satellites in local cable networks. All such local cable networks 
had to register with the Post- and Telecommunications Authority. The legalization in 1981 
initiated a large-scale roll-out of local cable networks. Because of economies of scale in laying 
the necessary cables, the roll-out took place primarily in densely populated areas (Norwegian 
Ministry of Culture, 1995). Mandatory registration continued until 2004, at which point 40 % 
of the population was covered. The aggregate evolution of the number of households covered 
is shown in Figure 2.  
4
  
Figure 2. Share of households with cable television 1970-2005 
   
The television data consist of the universe of Norwegian local cable networks up to 2004. 
They contain more than 11 000 unique networks, each with the number of households covered, 
first date of operation, and municipality. We combine this with data on the number of 
households in a municipality to obtain the yearly coverage rate in each municipality up to 
2005. The maps in Figure 5 show six snapshots of coverage across the country between 1980 
and 2005. They illustrate the considerable geographical disparities in the roll-out process, with 
cable networks first established in the Oslo-area, and then expanded to other densely 
populated areas throughout the country. To arrive at individualized exposed-to-TV-variables, 
we construct for each person born between 1974 and 1987, the cumulative cable TV coverage 
over their first 18 years in their municipality of birth. The resultant TV coverage variable thus 
varies from zero (for individuals who never had access to cable TV before age 18) to 18 (for 
individuals who had access throughout their childhood and adolescence).  
We do not have the same kind of data on coverage by parabolic antennas. However, there 
are two reasons why this is not a concern: First, parabolic antennas were providing only a 
small amount of television coverage in this period – when Statistics Norway started their 
media survey in 1991, only 5 % of households had a parabolic antenna. Second, since 
parabolic antennas were a substitute for cable, our “control group” actually had more 
television coverage than we assign them, which would tend to attenuate our estimates.  
3.2  Individual level data 
The rest of the data come from administrative registers. Our measure of cognitive ability is 
based on data from the Norwegian Armed Forces. Before military service, all Norwegian men 
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 undergo an assessment of suitability when they are 18 years old. From 1969/70, this 
assessment has included intelligence testing. All test-takers receive a score which is a 
composite of three tests, on arithmetic, word similarities and figures. This score is reported in 
stanine units, a measure that has a standard deviation of 2.2  
In addition to ability test scores, we apply outcomes intended to measure early career 
outcomes. These include a dichotomous variable indicating high-school completion at age 21 
(two years after the “normal” completion age). Moreover, we use dichotomous variables 
indicating education or employment at age 21 and disability benefit recipiency at age 21, 
respectively. 
We match the various outcomes with data on an individual’s municipality of birth and his 
parents’ characteristics. The first cohort in our sample is the cohort born in 1974, which is the 
first year from which we have data on residence at birth. We include all subsequent cohorts 
until and including the one born in 1987, which turned 18 years old in 2005. The reason why 
we stop at the 1987 birth cohort is that we do not have the ability to compute total coverage for 
later cohorts, as the mandatory registration of networks ended in 2004. To sum up, our sample 
consists of the birth cohorts 1974-1987, with outcomes measured in 1992-2005 (ability test 
scores) and 1995-2008 (early career outcomes). To allay worries concerning an increasing 
share of people with immigrant background taking the test, we include only men born in 
Norway to Norwegian-born parents.  
Tables 1 and 8 present a descriptive overview of the data we use in this paper, for the 
analysis population at large (Table 1), and for selected birth cohorts (Table 8). In total, we 
have around 311,000 observations. On average, the persons in our dataset had access to cable 
TV in only 3.45 years during their childhood and youth. But TV exposure increased 
considerably over time, from less than 2 exposure-years for our first cohorts to more than 5 for 
our last. The control variables we are going to use in our statistical analyses are defined at the 
individual or at the municipality-cohort levels, in both cases measured no later than the time of 
birth. In addition, we will in some cases use municipality characteristics measured in 1980 
(pre-legalization) interacted with time-trends or time-indicators. Individual characteristics 
comprise the educational attainment and earnings levels of both parents, whereas municipality 
characteristics cover socio-economic factors, such as average education, employment, and 
                                                 
2For expositional purposes, we sometimes refer to the test scores results in terms of IQ scores. When 
converting the stanine scores, which has a mean of 5 and a standard deviation of 2, to the IQ scale, which 
has a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15, we follow the practice of assigning a stanine score of 5 an 
IQ score of 100, and add/subtract 15/2 = 7.5 for each 1 stanine point upwards/downwards deviation from 5 
(Kristensen and Bjerkedal, 2007; Brinch and Galloway, 2012). The IQ score is thus calculated according to 
the formula IQ=100+(stanine−5)*7.5. 
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 earnings; see the tables for details. Most of the variables have been relatively stable across 
cohorts, with the exceptions of parental earnings and women’s employment. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
   mean sd min max 
Outcomes       
ability test score at age 18  5.17 (1.74)  1.00  9.00 
high school completed at age 21  0.67 (0.47)  0.00  1.00 
in work or education at age 21  0.87 (0.33)  0.00  1.00 
disability reception at age 21  0.03 (0.18)  0.00  1.00 
Explanatory variable       
TV, years of coverage until age 18  3.45 (3.70)  0.00 18.00 
Controls       
Individual-level       
education father, four levels  1.99 (0.83)  1.00  4.00 
education mother, four levels  1.83 (0.73)  1.00  4.00 
income father, 1000 USD 69.11 (30.44)  0.00 259.09 
income mother, 1000 USD 20.94 (22.87)  0.00 259.09 
Municipality-level       
schoolyears attained 11.44 (0.44)  8.90 12.84 
income males, 1000 USD 62.57 (8.17) 31.39 88.98 
income females, 1000 USD 25.52 (7.30)  6.58 45.94 
employment rate males  0.80 (0.04)  0.42  0.90 
employment rate females  0.44 (0.12)  0.08  0.71 
schoolyears attained 1980 11.45 (0.41) 10.14 12.63 
income males 1980, 1000 USD 64.43 (7.28) 38.75 82.53 
income females 1980, 1000 USD 25.88 (5.51) 12.72 37.48 
employment rate males 1980  0.81 (0.03)  0.56  0.89 
employment rate females 1980  0.45 (0.09)  0.18  0.62 
Observations  310587     
Note: Parental education in four levels (less than high school, completed 
high school, university bachelor, university master); income is yearly 
earnings measured in 2013 prices, converted to USD with an exchange rate 
of 1 USD=6.5 NOK and right-censored at 20 times the "basic amount" used 
by the Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme; municipality level income 
levels is calculated based on inhabitants aged 19-66; in calculating 
employment rates, we count as employed individuals with yearly earnings 
at least 2 times the basic amount, corresponding to around USD 26 000. 
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 4  Empirical strategy 
In order to identify the causal impacts of cable network expansion, we use the 
municipality-by-cohort specific coverage rate described in Section 2.1 as the key explanatory 
variable for the outcomes described in Section 2.2. The identifying assumption is then that the 
geographical roll-out of cable TV was as good as randomly assigned with respect to other 
factors that could have generated local variations in the developments of cognitive ability and 
other outcomes across cohorts. We argue that this assumption is likely to be satisfied, as there 
is evidence that the cable network expansion during the 1980’s and 1990’s was solely supply 
side driven. Building cable networks required heavy investment in infrastructure, and was only 
profitable in densely populated areas. Given that there was a large excess demand for cable 
TV everywhere, the actual expansion pattern was determined by economies of scale and 
physical/topological constraints. Participants from the supply side of the cable television 
market in this period have said that it is hard to see any factors other than suppliers’ capacity 
and population density that had an impact on where networks were built, and that after 
deregulation, suppliers were suddenly allowed to cater to a demand that had been present for a 
long time. 3 Further evidence for the exogeneity of coverage comes from considering the size 
and distribution of the networks. Many networks in a locality were constructed at the same 
time as parts of the same development. The average number of new households gaining access 
conditional on expansion in any given municipality-year, which is our observational unit, is 
691. Thus it is clear that access was determined at a quite different level than the household. 
The fact that cable networks did not operate in almost 40 % of municipalities (163 of 430) also 
shows that whether to obtain access was clearly not an individual-level decision.  
In 1999, a government White paper concluded that “significant development of cable 
networks beyond today’s level will most likely not be profitable (Norwegian Ministry of 
Culture, 1999, ch. 2.2),” and that “one does not expect significant further development of 
cable utilities beyond today’s coverage of around 38 % (Norwegian Ministry of Culture, 1999, 
ch. 2.3).” From Figure 2 we see that this assessment proved correct. The report cites 
topographical and physical barriers as reasons for why full coverage would not be possible.  
Although demand did not play a significant role for the roll-out of cable TV in Norway, we 
cannot a priori rule out that the (typically densely populated) areas selected for early 
                                                 
3 Former head of the union of commercial cable-TV operators in Norway, Knut Børmer; 
personal communication. Terje Frøsland, of the state owned Norwegian 
Telecommunications (Televerket, from 2005 Telenor); personal communication. 
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 expansion have been characterized by different developments in ability scores and early adult 
outcomes than other areas. Hence, as we detail in the next subsection, an important element of 
our empirical strategy is to examine our findings’ robustness with respect to the inclusion of 
various sets of control variables, also allowing for differential local trends.  
To assess more generally the likelihood of spurious trends, we examine in Figure 3 the 
pre-treatment trends in the cognitive ability test scores. Since all cohorts with available 
municipality of birth are treated, we cannot construct pre-trends by municipality of birth. 
However, what we can do for earlier cohorts is to construct pre-trends by municipality of 
residence in the test year (at age 18). We consider the test years 1974-1985 (equivalently, the 
birth cohorts of 1956-1967). We divide municipalities into three groups: One group consisting 
of municipalities that never had any cable television coverage at all, the two others created by 
grouping together municipalities with increase in cable television coverage between 1980 and 
2000 below or above the median increase in this period. Because of a renormalization of the 
scoring that was undertaken by the test administrators around 1980, we want to take out 
annual variation, and plot in Figure 3 the predicted residuals from a regression of test scores 
on a series of test year dummy variables. Though there is a difference in levels, it is reassuring 
that the three groups seem to follow a very similar development over time.  
 
 
Figure 3 IQ of Norwegian conscripts tested 1974-1985 by increase in television coverage 
1980-2000 in municipality of residence, deviations from yearly mean. 
   
To empirically assess the impacts of cable TV coverage, we use linear regression models 
with the various outcomes measured at age 18 or age 21 as dependent variables and the 
number of years with cable TV coverage until age 18 as the central explanatory variables. The 
9
 latter vary at the municipality-cohort level only. And since residence decisions may respond 
endogenously to the supply of TV channels, we fix individuals to their municipality of birth 
and assign them that municipality’s subsequent television coverage. This method clearly 
introduces some measurement error. It implies that we estimate the intention-to-treat effect at 
the baseline.  
In the most restrictive version of the model, we include as control variables municipality 
fixed effects (δm) and county-year fixed effects (Θct). The municipality-fixed effects are 
included to control for any time-invariant factors that vary between municipalities in a way 
that correlates with cable TV expansion. We can obviously not use municipality-year fixed 
effects, as that would totally absorb also the effects of interest. However, by including 
county-year fixed effects we control for time variations that are common within counties. 
There are 19 counties in Norway, and on average each county covers approximately 23 
municipalities. A somewhat unfortunate consequence of using county-year fixed effects is that 
we effectively throw out observations from Oslo, the capital city, which is by far the largest 
municipality and forms its own county. However, we exploit these data in a separate analysis, 
where we use observations from the largest cities/municipalities only (without county-year 
dummy variables).   
To account for socio-economic developments that potentially vary across municipalities, 
we include a covariate vector mmt consisting of municipality-level average education, male 
and female income, and male and female employment rate. These are all measured in the year 
of each cohort’s birth; hence they are not absorbed by the municipality-fixed effects. To arrive 
at what we label our “baseline model”, we further add a vector of parental characteristics. 
Family background is known to be important for young people’s outcomes; hence we can use 
these variables to reduce residual variance. We include a vector of parental characteristics pit 
consisting of parental income and indicator variables corresponding to four different 
categories of completed education (less than high school, high school, university bachelor, 
university master or above). As with the municipality covariates, the parental characteristics 
are measured at the year of birth of the individual.  
This gives the following regression equation:  
aimt = β TVmt + δm + Θct + mmt ζ + pit η + εimt ,  (1) 
which we estimate with OLS, with standard errors clustered at municipality. aimt denotes an 
individual’s ability score, while TVmt is an individual’s cumulative cable television coverage 
10
 since the year of birth. Since TVmt is measured in years, the coefficient will be interpretable 
as effect per year of coverage.  
Finally, as an additional check for spurious local trends, we interact the vector of 
pre-reform (1980) municipal characteristics with either a linear time trend or with year dummy 
variables.  
5  Main results 
Our main estimation results are reported in Table 2. The first row shows the results from 
the most restrictive model, where we only control for municipality and county-year fixed 
effects. With the cognitive ability score as the outcome, this specification gives an estimated 
coefficient on our television exposure measure of -0.015. To put this in perspective, we recall 
that the stanine scale has a standard deviation of 2, thus 0.015 constitutes 0.75 % of a standard 
deviation. Since the IQ scale has a standard deviation of 15, this estimated effect of one 
additional year of full television coverage would roughly correspond to a 0.11 points reduction 
in IQ. By comparison, Brinch and Galloway (2012) estimate the effect of one year of 
schooling to be around 3.7 IQ points using an education reform in Norway in the 1960’s. 
Taken at face value, our estimate thus indicates that 18 years of full cable TV coverage has a 
negative impact on cognitive ability comparable to half a year’s schooling. Carlsson et al. 
(forth.) use a quasi-experimental setting in Sweden to exploit variation in test taking date for 
young Swedish males preparing for military service. Their results imply that one year of 
schooling raises crystallized (synonyms and technical comprehension) test scores by around 
20 % of a standard deviation, corresponding to around 3 IQ points, but has no effect on fluid 
(spatial and logic) intelligence tests.  
Moving on to the other outcomes, our results indicate that one extra year of cable TV 
coverage reduces the probability of high-school completion by age 21 by around half a 
percentage point, and raises the probability of claiming a disability benefit by 0.1 percentage 
point. The effect on disability benefits suggests that how physical health is impacted may play 
a role. We do not find statistically significant evidence of effects on the overall probability of 
being in work or in education at age 21, though the point estimate is consistently negative, 
indicating that the high school dropouts are not finding gainful opportunities elsewhere. To 
again put the results in perspective, we note that the estimated effect on high-school 
completion is similar in size to the corresponding “effect” of one additional year of parental 
education, as reported by Bratberg et al. (2012, Figure 5). 
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 As we move downwards in Table 3, adding more and more control variables, it is 
reassuring that the estimates remain stable. Including time-varying municipality-level and 
parental covariates changes the estimated effects very little, and – if anything – raises the 
estimated effects of TV exposure.   
An important assumption so far has been that municipalities belonging to the same county 
would have followed a common development in time in the absence of cable television 
expansion. This assumption needs to be challenged. One way to do this would be to allow for 
separate linear time trends in each municipality. However, since the treatment is an 18 year 
cumulative of previous coverage in the municipalities, the expansion variables also almost 
follow linear trend patterns; hence including municipality-specific linear time trends would 
make identification infeasible. A better alternative is to allow municipalities to follow different 
time trends based on their pre-television legalization characteristics. We therefore interact the 
1980 levels of the municipality covariates – education level, male and female income and 
unemployment rate – with either linear time trends or year dummies. The results from these 
two specifications are shown in the fourth and fifth rows of results in table 3. The estimated 
coefficients are somewhat reduced, but remain of the same magnitude and are still precisely 
estimated.  
Since the expansion of cable TV largely was heavily influenced by population density, one 
may worry that differential outcome trends in areas with different population density may 
distort our results. For example, we could imagine that the development of cognitive abilities 
has been more negative in densely populated areas for reasons that have nothing to do with 
cable TV expansion. To assess this potential source of bias, we include in the final row of 
Table 3, linear time trends interacted with indicators of deciles of municipality population and 
population density measured in 1980. Standard errors increase as expected, but the coefficients 
hardly change at all.  
Our overall judgment is that estimated effects of cable TV expansion are highly robust 
with respect to model specification and the inclusion/exclusion of various groups of 
explanatory variables. 
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 Table 2. Main results – Effects of television exposure 
 Ability High School In work or Disability 
  graduate education recipient 
 Aggregate fixed effects -0.0151 -0.0044 -0.0003 0.0010 
 (0.0045) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0004) 
 *** ***  *** 
 Aggregate fixed effects -0.0161 -0.0054 -0.0010 0.0014 
+ municipality covariates (0.0045) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0004) 
 *** ***  *** 
 Aggregate fixed effects -0.0182 -0.0062 -0.0012 0.0015 
+ municipality covariates (0.0041) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0004) 
+ parental covariates *** ***  *** 
(Baseline)     
 Baseline -0.0119 -0.0043 -0.0010 0.0011 
+ Pre-reform demographics (0.0043) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0004) 
      #time trend *** ***  ** 
 Baseline -0.0115 -0.0042 -0.0010 0.0011 
+ Pre-reform demographics (0.0043) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0004) 
      #time FE *** ***  ** 
 Baseline -0.0101 -0.0040 -0.0016 0.0010 
+ Population and urbanity groups (0.0053) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0005) 
      #time trend * *** * * 
ymean 5.17 0.67 0.87 0.03 
N obs 280096 310584 310587 310587 
N muncipalities 430 430 430 430 
Note: “Aggregate fixed effects” includes municipality fixed effects and county-year fixed 
effects; “municipality covariates” includes average years of schooling attained, male and
female income levels, male and female employment rates; “parental covariates” includes
education level fixed effects and mother’s and father’s income. “Baseline” includes all of 
the preceding. “Pre-reform demographics” includes 1980 levels of the municipality
covariates. “Population and urbanity groups” includes fixed effects for the deciles of
municipality population and population density measured in 1980. When time trends are 
specified, only year fixed effects are included in stead of county-year fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered on municipality. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
6  Alternative models and robustness checks 
6.1  Restriction to the largest cities and municipalities 
As pointed out in Section 3, the use of county-year fixed effects in our main empirical analysis 
implies that we have not (so far) exploited data from Oslo, the capital. This is unfortunate, as 
Oslo has been in the forefront of the cable TV expansion development. As an alternative 
approach, we now focus exclusively on the most heavily populated areas in Norway; i.e., we 
construct two samples; one consisting of persons in the five largest cities (Oslo, Bergen, 
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 Trondheim, Kristiansand, Stavanger), and one consisting of the ten most populous 
municipalities in Norway. Using these samples answers two concerns: One is that there may 
have been unobserved factors impacting cognitive skills and educational and labor market 
outcomes of young people in large cities or urban regions in this period, and that this is picked 
up by our television measure, since the expansion largely took place in populous areas. A 
separate concern is that the expansion to some extent was demand-driven after all, and that the 
demand for cable TV could be correlated with the trends in our outcome measures. Though 
this may be a valid concern for very small municipalities, such a mechanism would be an 
unlikely factor to drive the results in a comparison between very large municipalities.  
The results are shown in Table 3. Apart from dropping the county-year dummy variables, 
the model specification is the same as for the baseline model in Table 3. Standard errors (still 
clustered at the municipality level) blow up with the reduced sample size, but the estimated 
effects remain quite stable. In particular for the ability test score, the coefficients are almost 
identical as in the baseline specification.  
Table 3. Restriction to the largest cities and municipalities 
 Ability High School In work or Disability 
  graduate education recipient 
5 largest cities -0.0114 -0.0004 -0.0024 -0.0005 
 (0.0140) (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0030) 
     
 ymean 5.44 0.70 0.86 0.03 
N obs 60780 66711 66713 66713 
N muncipalities 5 5 5 5 
10 largest municipalities -0.0176 -0.0061 -0.0023 0.0006 
(population in 1980>30000) (0.0101) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0012) 
  *   
ymean 5.41 0.69 0.86 0.03 
N obs 79006 87125 87127 87127 
N muncipalities 10 10 10 10 
Note: All models include municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects, municipality covariates
(average years of schooling attained, male and female income levels, male and female employment 
rates) and individual-level covariates (education level fixed effects and mother’s and father’s income). 
Standard errors clustered on municipality. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
 
6.2  Family fixed effects 
A particularly reliable source of identification of cable TV effects would be to compare 
brothers who have been subjected to different exposure intensities due to differences in age. 
Identification with family fixed effects will in practice only come from younger brothers 
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 having higher television exposure, thus we include fixed effects for sibling order in addition to 
family fixed effects to be sure not to pick up birth order effects. When running this demanding 
specification the point estimates are not statistically significant, ref. Table 4. The point 
estimates for ability and high school graduation are almost identical to those from the baseline 
specification, while those for the labor market outcomes differ.  
Table 4. Family fixed effects 
 Ability High School In work or Disability 
  graduate education recipient 
TV -0.0172 -0.0051 0.0029 -0.0001 
 (0.0175) (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0017) 
ymean 5.17 0.67 0.87 0.03 
N obs 280096 310584 310587 310587 
N families with >1 son 98235 109887 109887 109887 
Note: All models include municipality fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered on municipality. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
6.3  Parental selection into treatment 
Even though we measure television exposure at the baseline (municipality of birth), we may 
be concerned that would-be parents have already selected into certain municipalities before 
having children. If this generated an increasingly negatively selected population in 
TV-intensive municipalities, this would distort our estimates. To investigate this, we perform 
placebo regressions using as dependent variables the (pre-determined) parental covariates we 
use as control in our baseline specification.  
The results are shown in Table 5. If anything, the observed relationship is positive, in the 
sense that future television coverage is somewhat positively correlated with parents’ education 
and income in the offspring’s year of birth, though these correlations are not big, and also 
largely disappear when including the time trends/dummies interactions with the 
pre-legalization municipality-level characteristics.  
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 Table 5. Placebo regressions – parental characteristics in year of birth and future television 
exposure 
  Father   Mother  
 High School University Income High School University Income 
 degree degree  degree degree  
  Aggregate fixed effects 0.001 0.003 0.332 0.002 0.003 0.035 
+ municipality covariates (0.002) (0.001) (0.124) (0.001) (0.001) (0.080) 
        ** ***  **  
 Aggregate fixed effects -0.000 0.001 0.091 0.001 0.002 -0.111 
+ municipality covariates (0.002) (0.001) (0.105) (0.001) (0.001) (0.080) 
+ Pre-reform demographics     **  
      #time trend       
 Aggregate fixed effects -0.000 -0.002 -0.060 0.001 0.002 -0.118 
+ municipality covariates (0.002) (0.001) (0.107) (0.001) (0.001) (0.079) 
+ Pre-reform demographics     **  
      #time FE       
 Aggregate fixed effects -0.000 -0.002 -0.060 -0.002 -0.003 -0.179 
+ municipality covariates (0.002) (0.001) (0.107) (0.002) (0.001) (0.093) 
+ Population and urbanity     ** * 
      #time trend       
 ymean 0.39 0.19 66.05 0.29 0.16 23.82 
N obs 194469 194469 194469 194558 194558 194558 
N muncipalities 430 430 430 430 430 430 
Note: “Aggregate fixed effects” includes municipality fixed effects and county-year fixed effects;
“municipality covariates” includes average years of schooling attained, male and female income levels,
male and female employment rates. “Pre-reform demographics” includes 1980 levels of the municipality
covariates. “Population and urbanity groups” includes fixed effects for the deciles of municipality
population and population density measured in 1980. Standard errors clustered on municipality.
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
7  Mechanism 
Since we do not have geographically disaggregated data on television watching, we can only 
estimate the intention-to-treat effect of television coverage; however we can shed some light 
on the likely mechanism by analyzing heterogeneous effects and looking at aggregate data.  
7.1  Heterogeneous effects by socioeconomic status 
We analyze whether there is heterogeneity in the response based on individuals’ background. 
We focus on differences in economic resources and socioeconomic status, as measured by 
parental income. Parental resources may have implications both for the extent to which 
children’s TV consumption is regulated/monitored, and for the kind of alternative activities it 
substitutes for.  
In table Table 6 we estimate the baseline model by household income quartile, where 
income quartile is defined at the municipality level. The negative effects are comparable 
across quartiles, but largest for the lowest-income households, and smallest for the 
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 highest-income households. These results suggest that more resourceful families may be in a 
better position to regulate their children’s consumption of television.  
Table 6. Effect of television exposure by income quartiles 
 Ability High School In work or Disability 
  graduate education recipient 
Q1 -0.0264 -0.0074 -0.0037 0.0020 
 (0.0082) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0009) 
 *** *** ** ** 
ymean 4.90 0.57 0.83 0.04 
N obs 68981 77654 77656 77656 
Q2 -0.0152 -0.0053 -0.0013 0.0020 
 (0.0078) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0010) 
 * ***  * 
ymean 4.98 0.64 0.87 0.03 
N obs 70204 77635 77636 77636 
Q3 -0.0264 -0.0063 -0.0007 0.0015 
 (0.0075) (0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0009) 
 *** **  * 
ymean 5.19 0.69 0.88 0.03 
N obs 70093 77652 77652 77652 
Q4 -0.0071 -0.0059 -0.0009 0.0005 
 (0.0072) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0008) 
  ***   
ymean 5.58 0.77 0.90 0.02 
N obs 70818 77643 77643 77643 
Note: All models include municipality fixed effects county-year fixed 
effects, municipality covariates (average years of schooling, male and
female income levels, male and female employment rates) and
individual-level covariates (education level fixed effects and mother’s and 
father’s income). Standard errors clustered on municipality. Standard errors
in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
7.2  Critical periods 
We also split television exposure in three periods of six years each, roughly corresponding to 
the pre-school, elementary, and middle and high school periods. The effect is negative across 
ages, and largest in the period between ages 6 and 12, ref. Table 7. This finding corresponds 
well to the results of van den Berg et al. (2014), who find that the period around age 9 is 
critical for the development of adult cognitive ability and mental health, and suggests looking 
at something going on at this age for further evidence of what exactly television viewing 
crowded out. 
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 Table 8: Effect of television exposure at different ages. All models include municipality fixed effects county-year 
fixed effects, municipality covariates (average years of schooling, male and female income levels, male and 
female employment rates) and individual-level covariates (education level fixed effects and income for mother 
and father). Standard errors clustered on municipality. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 7. Effect of television exposure at different ages 
 Ability High School In work or Disability 
  graduate education recipient 
TV 0-5 -0.0133 -0.0041 -0.0008 0.0011 
 (0.0069) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0007) 
 * **   
TV 6-12 -0.0248 -0.0098 -0.0022 0.0023 
 (0.0088) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0009) 
 *** ***  ** 
TV 13-18 -0.0143 -0.0027 0.0004 0.0003 
 (0.0119) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0014) 
ymean 5.17 0.67 0.87 0.03 
N obs 280096 310584 310587 310587 
N muncipalities 430 430 430 430 
Note: All models include municipality fixed effects county-year fixed effects, 
municipality covariates (average years of schooling, male and female income
levels, male and female employment rates) and individual-level covariates
(education level fixed effects and mother’s and father’s income). Standard 
errors clustered on municipality. Standard errors in parentheses.* p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
7.3  Evidence from time use surveys 
Here we use data from time use surveys to look at how time spent on selected leisure activities 
have developed at an aggregate level in the time period that we are analyzing. Figure 4 shows 
that young men increased their time spent watching television throughout the end of the 20th 
century. Two activities that saw precipitous declines in the period in which television viewing 
increased most rapidly, 1990-2000, were reading and sports and outdoor activities. The shifts 
along the extensive margin were also dramatic. It is likely that the negative effects of 
television may operate through both less “mental exercise” from reading and a direct health 
effect, although from these aggregate figures, the decline in reading appears more important.  
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Figure 4. Time used on selected leisure activities by men aged 16-24 an average day. 
Left: Minutes spent an average day. Watching television; sports or outdoor activities; reading. 
Right: Percent of people who spent some time on the activity an average day.  
 
8  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have used the geographically staggered expansion of cable TV in Norway 
during the 1980’s and 1990’s to examine the impacts of access to commercial TV channels on 
children and youths. Our outcome measures include ability test scores (measured at age 18) 
and early career indicators, such as high school completion and disability benefit recipiency 
(at age 21). Our findings indicate that commercial TV affects ability test scores and high 
school completion rates negatively, and the risk of disability program entry positively. The 
estimated effects are moderately sized, but far from negligible. For example, one year of full 
cable television coverage lowers intelligence test scores by around 0.75 % of a standard 
deviation, corresponding to 0.1 IQ points. This is roughly 3 % of the previously estimated 
impact of one year extra schooling (Brinch and Galloway, 2012). The same increase in cable 
TV reduces the high-school completion rate at age 21 by around half a percentage point.  
While our point estimates should be interpreted with some care – given a considerable 
degree of statistical uncertainty, the qualitative nature of our main findings are extremely 
robust. We perform a large number of robustness analyses, all confirming the negative impacts 
on cognitive ability and high-school completion. The negative impacts are largest for TV 
exposure around age 6-12; i.e., during primary school age. And they are larger for low-income 
than for high-income households.  
It is probable that the developmental impacts of increased supply of TV entertainment 
during childhood depend both on the extent to which the actual consumption of entertainment 
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 is regulated by parents and on the kind of activities TV consumption substitutes for. These 
factors vary across households, and may explain why there apparently is a social gradient in 
the negative cognitive/educational effects. Data from time-use-surveys indicate that the 
increase in TV consumption on average substituted for reading; hence, one may hypothesize 
that the negative effects identified in our paper do not stem from increases in  TV 
consumption per se, but rather by the resultant reduction in reading activities.  
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 Appendix 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics, selected cohorts 
 Year of birth 
 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1987 
  mean  mean  mean  mean  mean  mean  mean  mean 
Outcomes                  
ability test score at age 18  5.25  5.25  5.24  5.15  5.16  5.10  5.05  4.99 
high school completed at age 21  0.66  0.69  0.68  0.67  0.68  0.66  0.64  0.65 
in work or education at age 21  0.83  0.87  0.89  0.89  0.89  0.88  0.90  0.90 
disability reception at age 21  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
Explanatory variable                  
TV, years of coverage until age 18  1.99  2.41  2.81  3.28  3.77  4.28  4.87  5.07 
Controls  
Individual-level                  
education father, four levels  1.90  1.95  1.99  2.01  2.00  2.01  2.01  2.00 
education mother, four levels  1.79  1.83  1.85  1.84  1.82  1.82  1.84  1.85 
income father, 1000 USD 64.70 67.59 67.37 70.70 65.94 66.88 75.38 74.58 
income mother, 1000 USD 13.39 15.28 17.49 21.08 21.56 23.52 28.93 29.69 
Municipality-level                  
schoolyears attained 11.16 11.26 11.35 11.45 11.52 11.59 11.67 11.69 
income males, 1000 USD 59.87 62.31 61.14 64.31 59.60 59.85 67.18 66.16 
income females, 1000 USD 18.21 21.01 22.66 25.75 25.73 27.45 33.10 33.60 
employment rate males  0.79  0.80  0.81  0.81  0.79  0.78  0.80  0.80 
employment rate females  0.31  0.35  0.39  0.45  0.46  0.48  0.56  0.57 
schoolyears attained 1980 11.47 11.46 11.45 11.45 11.45 11.45 11.47 11.47 
income males 1980, 1000 USD 64.43 64.49 64.43 64.31 64.36 64.33 64.66 64.72 
income females 1980, 1000 USD 26.06 25.96 25.86 25.75 25.75 25.77 26.04 26.06 
employment rate males 1980  0.81  0.81  0.82  0.81  0.82  0.81  0.82  0.82 
employment rate females 1980  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45 
Observations  23860 21643 21939 21893 22207 21764 22870 23171 
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Figure 5. Cable television coverage by municipality, 1980-2005 
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Chapter II
Crisis and work eﬀort:
Sickness absence in the aftermath of terrorism∗
Øystein Hernæs
Department of Economics
European University Institute
Abstract
I analyze how sickness absence behavior in Norwegian municipalities
was aﬀected by the terrorist attack in Norway on July 22, 2011. Using
the geographical variation of victims’ home municipality and register data
covering the complete Norwegian population in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach, I ﬁnd that sickness absence rates declined substantially in mu-
nicipalities aﬀected more intensely by the attack. In municipalities from
which a resident was killed in the attack, sickness absence rates declined by
4 % compared to municipalities without victims. The eﬀect is precisely es-
timated, stable across speciﬁcations including municipality-speciﬁc trends
or time trends based on pre-attack demographics, does not show up in
placebo regressions on other time periods, and persists for as long as there
is available data. The results do not seem to be driven by an eﬀect on labor
market composition or traditional measures of social capital. The eﬀect for
people in their 20’s is more than twice that for the population at large – for
this group, local exposure to the attack decreased absence rates by around
10 %. As most of the victims were teenagers or young adults, this supports
a mechanism where people were inﬂuenced by personally identifying with
the victims.
∗Data from Statistics Norway and Kommunedatabasen, a database on Norwegian regional
data administered by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD), has been essential for
this project. Statistics Norway and NSD are not responsible for the analysis of the data or for
the interpretations in the present article.
24
1 Introduction
Do crises induce eﬀort? Hard times may motivate people to work harder because
their economic well-being is threatened. However, a crisis may foster eﬀort even
without altering economic fundamentals. In this paper I provide evidence on the
latter case.
Terrorist attacks typically leave the economic structures of society largely
intact, and thereby provide a setting to test economic mechanisms operating
through other channels. On July 22, 2011 Norway was struck by a terrorist
attack in which a total of 77 people were killed. I analyze the eﬀect of local
exposure to the attack on sickness absence behavior. Sickness absence can in this
case be seen as a measure of work eﬀort, since the attack for most people did
not alter the physical determinants of actual sickness. Another advantage with
sickness absenteeism is that it is something an individual can impact by his or
her own without depending on anyone else.
Simply comparing aggregate outcomes before and after the attack might be
misleading, since many other things may also have happened in the meantime.
For example, there are large seasonal variations in sickness absence. A key point
in my analysis is that although the country as a whole was deeply aﬀected by the
attack, people were personally impacted to an unequal degree.
The attack was directed at the Norwegian government generally, and at the
Labor party in particular. The perpetrator placed a bomb in the government
quarters in downtown Oslo before he went on to the summer camp of the Nor-
wegian Labor Party’s youth organization, a 45 minute drive and a short boat
trip from Oslo. The summer camp is a traditional yearly gathering of Labor
youth party members from around the country and always takes place on the
island of Utøya. Most of the victims (69) were participants at the summer camp.
The fact that the victims came from diﬀerent parts of the country allows me to
identify how people in a local community responded to the killing of one of the
members of that community. In particular, I analyze how absence levels were
aﬀected in victims’ and survivors’ municipalities, using other municipalities as a
control group. This means that common shocks like seasonal variations will be
diﬀerenced out, and that I do not estimate national-level eﬀects, but rather the
additional response of local communities.
I ﬁnd that the 2011 terrorist attack lead to a substantial reduction in sickness
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absence in municipalities aﬀected more severely by the attack. In municipalities
that lost an inhabitant, the sickness absence rate fell by 0.25 percentage points
in the time following the attack. In municipalities which had inhabitants present
on Utøya, the main site of the attack, but lost none, the sickness absence rate fell
by 0.16 percentage points. Since the average absence rate is 6.10 % in this time
period, these eﬀects correspond to drops in the absence rate of 4.0 % and 2.5
%, respectively. The results are robust to controlling for relevant municipality
characteristics and several types of unobserved time trends.
Consistent with a mechanism where people are inﬂuenced by personally iden-
tifying with the victims (average age 22, median 18), the eﬀect for people in their
20’s is more than twice that for the population at large. For this group, local
exposure to the attack decreased absence rates by around 10 %.
2 Related literature
In thinking about the impact of traumatic events on sickness absence, it is useful
to distinguish between eﬀects that might increase or decrease absence.
Physical and psychological injuries will of course increase sickness absence,
and even though extra funds aimed at helping close relatives and survivors were
allocated to the municipalities a short time after the attacks, studies have doc-
umented elevated post-traumatic stress among both survivors from Utøya (Dyb
et al., 2014) and those that were present at work in the government buildings in
Oslo when the bomb exploded (Hansen et al., 2013). In general, the death of a
close relative is also associated with an increase in sickness absence (Markussen
et al., 2011). Thus absence levels will likely have increased for those experiencing
the attack ﬁrst or second hand.
Individuals not experiencing the attack ﬁrst or second hand may certainly
also be traumatized, however for this much larger group it is not clear that the
absence-increasing eﬀects will dominate. Research on the 9/11, 2001 attack in
the US has found that the attack in some ways lead to increased societal cohesion,
as measured by trust and support for the government (Chanley, 2002; Traugott
et al., 2002; Ford et al., 2003; Abramson et al., 2007). Likewise, Norwegian
researchers have found higher reported trust levels in Norway after the 2011
attack than before (Wollebæk et al., 2012). A widely used measure of social
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capital is blood donations - in the afternoon and evening of the July 22 attack,
hundreds of people showed up at the blood bank in Oslo wanting to donate blood
(Akko¨k, 2011), indicating that the will to contribute to the common good was
indeed stirred.
Relatedly, some studies have documented a link between exposure to violence
and political participation (Laufer and Solomon, 2006; Blattman, 2009; Hersh,
2013). These authors all relate their ﬁndings to the psychological literature on
“post-traumatic growth,” deﬁned as “the experience of positive change that oc-
curs as a result of the struggle with highly challenging life crises (Tedeschi and
Calhoun, 2004, p.1).” This ﬁts particularly well with the narrative about the
eﬀects of the attack on young people that has dominated in Norwegian society
– “generation Utøya” has come to mean the adolescent generation who was sup-
posedly shocked into a more serious outlook on life by seeing so many of their
peers being brutally executed.
The assumption that there is scope for a reduction in absence by such forces
and that sickness absence in this context can be taken as a measure of eﬀort is
supported by the literature showing that there is indeed an element of choice
in sickness absence behavior, as evidenced by studies of the eﬀects of ﬁnancial
incentives (Johansson and Palme, 2005; Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2010), moni-
toring (D’Amuri, 2011; De Paola et al., 2014), group interaction eﬀects (Ichino
and Maggi, 2000; Bradley et al., 2007), and employment protection (Ichino and
Riphahn, 2005; Olsson, 2009).
Since I employ municipality-level data I will estimate the average of the op-
posing eﬀects.
3 Data
Data on victims come from two sources: The home municipalities of the 77 de-
ceased victims are collected from Stormark (2011). In total 52 municipalities
had at least one inhabitant killed. The main site of the attack was the island
of Utøya. There 66 people were injured, while 585 survived without physical
harm (Norwegian Directorate of Health, 2012). Data on which municipalities
from which there were inhabitants present on Utøya has been acquired from the
18 County Governors, who disbursed funds targeted at following up these indi-
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viduals in their respective municipalities. I know that in total 127 municipalities
had surviving inhabitants, but I do not have information about the number of
survivors from individual municipalities.
Quarterly data on physician-certiﬁed sickness absence come from adminis-
trative registers from Statistics Norway covering the full Norwegian population.
The deﬁnition of the sickness absence rate is “man-days lost due to own sickness
as a percentage of contractual man-days.” The rest of the municipality data is
also based on population registers, and is extracted from Kommunedatabasen, a
database on Norwegian regional data administered by the Norwegian Social Sci-
ence Data Services (NSD). Five of the country’s 428 municipalities are dropped
because of inconsistent time series caused by municipality mergers.
Table (1) shows descriptive statistics for several pre-attack municipality-level
variables by future treatment status. The column with the heading T1 comprises
municipalities from which an inhabitant was killed in the attack, while T2 covers
municipalities that lost none, but that had at least one inhabitant was present
at the main site of the attack. Thus, T1 and T2 are mutually exclusive.
There are some systematic diﬀerences between the three groups. First, the T1
group has a higher level of sickness absence than the two others. Second, there is
considerable oversampling of large and densely populated municipalities into the
treatment groups. This is not surprising, in that such municipalities likely had
more participants, both because of the larger population itself and because more
centralized municipalities oﬀer easier travel routes. The three groups are highly
similar with regards to other variables.
Although what is important for my purposes is that the trends of the groups
balance, since all permanent diﬀerences will be absorbed by the municipality ﬁxed
eﬀects, I include a discussion in the appendix of where the diﬀerence in pre-level
sickness absence levels might come from. The conclusion is that they seem to
be related to more people participating from urban municipalities, which tend to
have somewhat higher absence rates than more rural municipalities in the same
area.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 2010 (pre-treatment) by future treatment status
T1 T2 Control
mean sd mean sd mean sd
sickness absence rate, % 6.29 (1.024) 6.04 (1.012) 5.97 (1.251)
population, 1000 36.76 (84.464) 15.57 (25.911) 3.94 (3.770)
population density 0.72 (0.206) 0.62 (0.254) 0.41 (0.259)
income (USD 1000) 50.96 (5.164) 50.26 (5.076) 46.99 (4.196)
unemployment males, % 2.74 (0.530) 2.48 (0.692) 2.60 (1.122)
public sector, share of labor force 0.21 (0.058) 0.20 (0.050) 0.25 (0.069)
health and social, share of labor force 0.21 (0.031) 0.20 (0.032) 0.21 (0.035)
female workers, share of labor force 0.47 (0.012) 0.47 (0.013) 0.46 (0.015)
education, average years of schooling 11.94 (0.426) 11.80 (0.348) 11.55 (0.321)
disability recipients, share of inhabitants 0.07 (0.016) 0.07 (0.017) 0.07 (0.022)
welfare recipients, share of inhabitants 0.03 (0.008) 0.02 (0.007) 0.03 (0.011)
Labor party vote share 2007 0.31 (0.098) 0.30 (0.111) 0.30 (0.144)
Labor party vote share 2009 0.37 (0.085) 0.36 (0.086) 0.34 (0.091)
Progress party vote share 2007 0.18 (0.078) 0.16 (0.094) 0.10 (0.096)
Progress party vote share 2009 0.24 (0.054) 0.23 (0.060) 0.22 (0.061)
N 52 122 249
Note: Sickness absence rate measures “man-days lost due to own sickness as a percentage of contractual
man-days;” population density is the share of inhabitants in a municipality living in an “urban settle-
ment” (a hub of buildings inhabited by at least 200 persons, with a minimum distance of 50 m between
buildings); income is average gross income of all persons aged 17 or more, converted to USD with an ex-
change rate of 1 USD=6.5 NOK; unemployment is percentage of men with no earnings, averaged through
the year; public sector counts share of workers employed in municipal or state administration; health
and social denotes share of workers employed in health and social services, both public and private.
4 Empirical strategy
The identiﬁcation comes from the geographical distribution of participants and
victims. I employ a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences design with two treatments varying
among municipalities: Whether one or more individuals from the municipality
were killed in the attack (T1); and whether one or more people were present on
Utøya, but of whom none were killed (T2). Thus the treatments are mutually
exclusive. Since T1 can be considered similar to, but more intense than T2, I
expect the eﬀects to have the same direction, but the eﬀects of T1 to be stronger.
The identifying assumption is that conditional on area and time ﬁxed eﬀects,
participation at the camp and the identity of the victims are uncorrelated with
determinants of sickness absence. This assumption will be challenged in several
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ways.
I assume that people living in a municipality from which someone was killed
or survived received a higher degree of exposure to the event than people living
in other municipalities. The most direct channel would have been direct and
indirect personal connections and public events. In the election survey after the
2011 election, respondents from treated municipalities were more likely to have
attended a public event related to the attack afterwards than others.
Media coverage also probably played a role: There is a substantial share of
people who report to read district and local newspapers (Statistics Norway, 2014),
of which the country has almost 200 (Høst, 2012). More generally, local identity
is strong in Norway. This can be evidenced by high turnout in municipal elections
(60-65 %) and the fact that most within country migration takes place within
municipality boundaries (Statistics Norway, 2013). In a 2004 survey, only around
half of respondents felt an aﬃliation (“tilhørighet”) to people in their neighboring
municipalities (Frisvoll and Alma˚s, 2004). The fact that news about individuals
is routinely accompanied by information about their municipality of residence
also indicates the perception that this information captures a salient feature of
a person’s identity. Such reporting was the case with the July 22 attack as well,
and in fact lists of victims and basic information about them, such as name, age,
and home municipality, continue to be maintained online by two of the major
news outlets to this day (NRK, 2015; Verdens Gang, 2015).
4.1 Time trends
It is essential for the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences design that time trends are parallel,
I therefore show in Figure (1) the time trends in the pre- and post-period. I
later estimate on a time series from 2008, but show the trends from 2010 here
for visibility. The trends for the period 2008-2014, shown in Figure (4) in the
appendix, follow the same pattern.
From Figure (1) alone it is possible to see the basic ﬁndings. The groups
clearly follow very similar trends before the attack. The dashed, vertical line
indicates the quarter in which the attack took place, after which the level of the
T1 group visibly drops relative to the others, while the T2 group exhibits a more
delayed response.
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Figure 1: Sickness absence levels 2010 - 2014 by quarter and treatment status.
Vertical line indicates the quarter in which the terrorist attack took place.
4.2 Empirical model
I estimate the following linear baseline empirical model:
ymt = β1T1mt + β2T2mt + δm + γt + mt (1)
ymt denotes sickness absence rate in percent; T1 and T2 are indicator variables
which are 0 for all time periods up to and including the third quarter of 2011,
then switch to 1 in the remaining periods for those municipalities that received
the respective treatments. Whether or not to include the quarter in which the
attack took place makes essentially no diﬀerence for the results. T1 indicates that
at least one inhabitant of the municipality was killed in the attack, T2 that at
least one inhabitant of the municipality was present on Utøya, but no inhabitants
were killed. Thus T1 and T2 are mutually exclusive.
All regressions will include municipality ﬁxed eﬀects δm and time (year x
quarter) ﬁxed eﬀects γt and cluster standard errors at municipality. As ro-
bustness checks I include several time-varying municipality covariates, interac-
tions between time trends and the 2010-levels of the municipality covariates, and
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municipality-speciﬁc linear time trends.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline results and robustness checks
Table (2) displays the basic results and robustness tests. The ﬁrst column shows
the results from the baseline speciﬁcation with no controls other than time and
municipality ﬁxed eﬀects. The sickness absence rate dropped by 0.25 percentage
points after the attack in municipalities from which an inhabitant was killed, and
0.16 percentage points in the less intensely treated municipalities from which an
inhabitant participated, but survived.
Adding a list of covariates relevant to sickness absence in the second col-
umn does not have a large impact on the results, as these covariates do not
vary very much and municipality ﬁxed eﬀects are already included. More strin-
gent robustness tests are given by the third and fourth columns, which adds
municipality-speciﬁc linear time trends (3) or linear time trends interacted with
the 2010-levels of relevant covariates (4). In include population and population
density in the latter trend speciﬁcation, as we saw from the descriptive statistics
that the treatment and control groups diﬀered substantially on these measures.
This speciﬁcation allows the municipalities to follow diﬀerent trends depending
on the pre-attack levels of these characteristics. I also include the vote share of
the Labor party in the 2009 election in a similar way to capture whether there
were particular developments taking place in municipalities characterized by high
(or low) support for the Labor party, which itself of course was hit severely by
the attack. The results are robust across speciﬁcations.
The baseline results mean that sickness absence declined by 4.0 % from the
average of 6.10 % in the most intensively treated group, and by 2.6 % in the
second treatment group. Since the eﬀects on those closest to the victims are al-
most certainly absence-increasing and there are spillovers between municipalities
because of personal relationships, the true absence-decreasing eﬀects are likely
even larger.
The absolute size of the estimated coeﬃcients are very similar when consid-
ering women and men separately, ref. Table 6 in the appendix. Since women as a
group have almost three percentage points higher absence rate than men (7.6 %
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vs. 4.9 %), this means that the percent reduction was much larger for men than
women, 5.0 % as opposed to 3.2 %.
Table 2: Eﬀects on sickness absence–main results and robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
T1 -0.245*** -0.243*** -0.209** -0.211***
(0.066) (0.067) (0.092) (0.070)
T2 -0.161*** -0.153*** -0.103 -0.138**
(0.058) (0.057) (0.079) (0.058)
population density No Yes Yes Yes
population No Yes Yes Yes
schoolyears No Yes Yes Yes
health social sector share No Yes Yes Yes
female share of labor force No Yes Yes Yes
population#time trend No No No Yes
pop.density#time trend No No No Yes
Labor party vote (2009)#time trend No No No Yes
municipality-speciﬁc time trends No No Yes No
year#quarter f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
municip. f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.242 0.244 0.380 0.248
N 10152 10152 10152 10152
# municipalities 423 423 423 423
depvar mean 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10
depvar sd 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24
Note: Sickness absence is measured in percent. Point estimates are to be interpreted as
eﬀects in percentage points. In speciﬁcation with covariate#time trend, population and
population density are measured in 2010, Labor party vote in 2009 election. Time period
2008q1-2013q4. Standard errors clustered at municipality. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
5.2 Dynamics
To investigate the dynamics of the eﬀects I include lags and leads for the timing
of the attack. Time t is the quarter in which the attack took place, i.e. the third
quarter of 2011, and denotes a variable that takes the value 1 in this quarter
for those municipalities that received treatment T1 and 0 at all other times. I
include three further quarters back (t-1, t-2, t-3) to have a full year, and lags
as long as the data go, until the second quarter in 2014 (t+1 to t + 11). The
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logic is the same for treatment T2. The results are reported in Table (8) in the
appendix. The estimated treatment coeﬃcients from the baseline speciﬁcation
(containing only municipality and time ﬁxed eﬀects) are plotted graphically in
ﬁgures (2) and (3).
The leads serve as a check on the assumption that the two groups followed
similar trends. It is reassuring that the coeﬃcients on the leaded shocks are all
quite precisely centered on zero.
Given that much of the third quarter of 2011 took place after the attack, one
may wonder why there seems to be no eﬀect in that quarter. The main expla-
nation is that long absence spells (more than one month) are behind 2/3 of the
overall absence rate, thus any intervention not leading to early return from spells
that have already started is bound to operate with a signiﬁcant lag. In addition,
it is possible that there were initial absence-increasing eﬀects which counteracted
the absence-decreasing eﬀects; or that the eﬀects worked through long-term ab-
senteeism, and thus needed some time to respond. Both these explanations may
be true, and although I cannot disentangle them with the present data, there
are some observations that suggest the importance of the impact through long-
term absenteeism: First is the continued, gradual decline, which would follow
readily from a reduction in new long-term spells. Second, when analyzing data
on spell duration at the national level and controlling only for year and quarter
ﬁxed eﬀects separately, very long spells (>one quarter) is the category showing
a signiﬁcant decline in the post-treatment period.
From t + 1 onwards, the drop of about 0.2 percentage points for treatment
T1 sets in immediately and shows signs of becoming even larger with time.
The response to treatment T2 shows a somewhat diﬀerent pattern. Consistent
with treatment T2 being less intense, the absence rate reacts less dramatically in
the short run, but with time approaches the response of the T1 group, with an
eﬀect of about 0.2 percentage points, suggesting that the underlying slow-moving
mechanics are much the same. The estimated coeﬃcients are graphed in ﬁgure
(3).
The results from the analysis of the dynamics of the eﬀects supports the
basic identiﬁcation strategy and show that the eﬀects are highly persistent. The
persistence indicates that people do not increase their presence at work out of a
demand for information or of curiosity, forces that would surely dissipate with
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time.
Figure 2: Impact of T1 by quarter. Estimated coeﬃcients from “Baseline” spec-
iﬁcation in Table (8). Time t is the quarter in which the attack took place,
i.e. the third quarter of 2011. Each bar displays the estimated eﬀect of a one-
period treatment taking place in the time period indicated on the horizontal axis.
Vertical bars indicate 95 % conﬁdence intervals.
5.3 Population size
The treatments take place at the municipality level. To investigate the role
played by population size, I here weight observations by population and estimate
on subsamples deﬁned by population size.
Table (8) shows the results from regressions where observations are weighted
by municipality working age population. Column (1) presents the baseline model
with municipality and time ﬁxed eﬀects, but now weighting observations. Weight-
ing reduces the size of the estimated coeﬃcients in the baseline speciﬁcation.
Since the treatments are plausibly weaker in larger populations, this is not sur-
prising. Because of the presence of a few very large municipalities, I include
regressions where I exclude (2) the largest municipality (Oslo), (3) the three
largest (Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim), (4) municipalities with working age popula-
tion above 50 000, and ﬁnally (5) municipalities with working age population
of 25 000 or above. As I exclude the largest municipalities, the results quickly
approach the unweighted estimates from Section 5.1.
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Figure 3: Impact of T2 by quarter. Estimated coeﬃcients from “Baseline” spec-
iﬁcation in Table (8). Time t is the quarter in which the attack took place,
i.e. the third quarter of 2011. Each bar displays the estimated eﬀect of a one-
period treatment taking place in the time period indicated on the horizontal axis.
Vertical bars indicate 95 % conﬁdence intervals.
Table (9) shows the results from estimations on subsamples of municipalities
with between 10 000 and 20 000 inhabitants and fewer than 10 000 inhabitants.
The results conﬁrm that the eﬀect was somewhat stronger in smaller munici-
palities. I do not include a subsample of municipalities with more than 20 000
inhabitants, as only two of these municipalities did not receive any treatment.
The overall picture is that once very large municipalities are excluded, the
eﬀects seem to depend on population size in a quite limited way, suggesting that
though personal connections probably did play a role in the treatments, so did
more general municipality-wide factors.
5.4 Log-linear speciﬁcation
The simple linear model does not make assumptions about the relationship be-
tween the eﬀect and the starting value. Table (10) provides the results from
regressions with the natural logarithm of the sickness absence rate as dependent
variable, which corresponds to assuming that the relative change is the same
across starting levels. The main diﬀerence is that the eﬀect of T2 here seems
more comparable to that of T1, however, in general the results are quite in line
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with those from the linear model, with coeﬃcients between -0.037 and -0.03, and
-0.03 and -0.025 for the two groups, respectively.
5.5 Placebo test on 2001-2007
As a placebo test I move the time window from 2008-2013 to the up to now
unused 2001-2007 and introduce the treatments on the corresponding points on
the timeline. I.e. instead of the treatments taking place in the third quarter of
2011, they now occur in the third quarter of 2004. The results are shown in Table
(11). The estimated coeﬃcients are very close to zero across all speciﬁcations.
6 Mechanism
In this section I investigate several possible channels for the results. First, I
ﬁnd no evidence that the large downward shift in sickness absence are due to an
eﬀect on labor market composition. Second, analyzing various measures of social
capital, I again ﬁnd that these do not explain the results. Third, I disaggregate
sickness absence by age groups. From the analysis by age groups, a distinct
ﬁnding emerges, which is that the youngest workers responded much stronger
than older ones, i.e. their absence rates declined more. I take this as support for
the hypothesis that personal identiﬁcation with the victims played a substantial
role.
6.1 Labor force composition
The persistence of the eﬀects may suggest an explanation in terms of a shift
in labor force composition. Below I analyze the eﬀects on disability and labor
market participation. The results are in Tables (12) and (13) in the appendix.
One possible mechanism is that people with a high propensity for absence
sorted into disability after the attack. Using quarterly data from 2010 onwards I
do not ﬁnd any eﬀect on the disability rate. The point estimates are small and
even negative in most of the speciﬁcations.
Another possibility is that high-absence individuals dropped out of the labor
market completely, so it is reasonable to investigate labor force participation gen-
erally. Here the picture is somewhat ambiguous. The baseline speciﬁcation (only
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municipality and time ﬁxed eﬀects) gives a positive estimate, while introducing
covariates brings the estimate down to zero. Overall, there are no clear signs that
labor force participation is the mechanism.
I ﬁnd no evidence that an eﬀect on the composition of workers is driving the
results.
6.2 Social capital
As referenced in section 2, studies in political science and psychology have found
associations between shocks such as terrorist attacks and subsequent increases
in various measures of social capital. To investigate whether this might be a
relevant mechanism for the results on work eﬀort, I analyze the eﬀect on turnout
in elections, donations to charity, membership in organizations, and levels of trust,
all of which have been seen as measures of social capital (Knack and Keefer, 1997;
Guiso et al., 2004). The results are given in table 3 below.
Using election data from the local elections 1999-2011, the eﬀects of the treat-
ments are precisely estimated at 0, as shown in the ﬁrst column. In the second
column I also analyze the average amount donated to “TV-aksjonen”, an annual
fundraising event taking place in October. In 2011 the funds donated went to
Norwegian People’s Aid and their work on removing mines and bombs in former
war zones. The unit is dollars donated per capita, and as can be seen, the point
estimates are very small. Both these measures are population-level data.
Using the oﬃcial surveys after the elections in 2003, 2007, and 2011 allows
me to perform analyses at the individual level. The surveys contained questions
about membership in organizations and trust. The point estimates for member-
ship in some organization are positive, while those for trust are negative.
Overall, no consistent pattern of how these traditional measures of social
capital were aﬀected appears, and point estimates are generally small and point
in diﬀerent directions.
6.3 Eﬀect heterogeneity by age
In Section 5 we saw that the eﬀects of the two treatments on the overall absence
rate were precisely estimated at around -0.25 and -0.16, or -3.9 and -2.6 %, and
highly robust across model speciﬁcations. However, if the underlying mechanism
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Table 3: Eﬀect on social capital
Turnout Charity Member Trust
(Population) (Population) (Survey) (Survey)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
T1 0.004 0.006 0.020 -0.076
(0.005) (0.159) (0.055) (0.324)
T2 0.004 -0.145 0.038 -0.619**
(0.003) (0.144) (0.046) (0.261)
year f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
municipality f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
ymean 0.64 7.14 0.62 6.75
R-sqr 0.859 0.853 0.097 0.196
N 1720 3825 4597 3097
Note: Turnout is municipality-level turnout in the municipal elections 1999,
2003, 2007, 2011. Charity is dollars donated per capita in the fundraising
event “TV-aksjonen,” yearly 2003-2013. Member is a dummy variable indi-
cating whether the respondent is a member of an organization or not, Trust
indicates level of agreement with the statement that most people can be
trusted (10=agrees). Years 2003-2007-2011. Standard errors clustered on
municipality. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
is one where people are identifying with the victims and evaluating their own
situation in comparison with them, we should not expect the eﬀects to be uniform
across the age distribution. In particular, since a notorious feature of the attack
was the young age of the victims (the average age of the victims was 22), we
should expect the eﬀects to be larger for the youngest workers.
In Table (4) I divide the working population into nine age groups. The es-
timated eﬀects are largest for people in their 20’s, whose absence was reduced
by up to 0.5 percentage points. When taking into account the very diﬀerent
underlying means of the age groups, the young stand out even more strikingly.
The two bottom rows display the percent change for each of the groups. We see
that among workers closest to the victims’ age, i.e. those aged 20-24, absence
rates dropped by 11 and 9 % from the the two treatments, respectively. Consis-
tent with expectations, the eﬀects are also quite strong, though somewhat lower,
for people towards the end of their 20’s, while broadly leveling oﬀ after that to
around the pooled eﬀects.
There is invariably more noise in these estimates, as each observation results
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from aggregating over a smaller number of individuals. Nevertheless, the results
are substantial, consistent, and for the most part quite precise. For some age
groups, some municipality-quarters are missing for certain small municipalities
as numbers are not published if they are the result of too few individuals. In
Table (4) these observations are treated as missing at random. To provide a
check on this, Table (14) in the appendix excludes all such municipalities entirely
when looking at each age group. The general picture is the same.
To sum up, when disaggregating by age groups, there is a clear ﬁnding that the
reduction in sickness absence was much larger among young people than among
older ones, supporting the popular notion that identifying with the victims played
an important role.
Table 4: Eﬀect on sickness absence – by age group.
age20-24 age25-29 age30-34 age35-39 age40-44 age45-49 age50-54 age55-59 age60-66
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
T1 -0.482 -0.371 -0.156 -0.326 -0.215 -0.164 -0.224 -0.267 -0.329
(0.121) (0.136) (0.140) (0.129) (0.117) (0.124) (0.123) (0.144) (0.181)
*** *** ** * * * *
T2 -0.379 -0.465 0.083 -0.089 -0.142 -0.326 -0.155 -0.057 -0.168
(0.109) (0.120) (0.122) (0.128) (0.111) (0.115) (0.123) (0.135) (0.180)
*** *** ***
y-q f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
municip. f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.084 0.066 0.058 0.037 0.046 0.038 0.041 0.044 0.070
N 10918 10929 10945 10976 10983 10987 10992 10985 10987
# municip. 423 423 423 423 423 423 423 423 423
depvar mean 4.23 5.61 6.09 5.99 5.92 5.99 6.40 6.98 8.31
depvar sd 2.00 2.31 2.33 2.16 1.97 2.01 2.20 2.38 3.02
% change
T1 -11.4 -6.6 -2.6 -5.4 -3.6 -2.7 -3.5 -3.8 -4.0
T2 -9.0 -8.3 1.4 -1.5 -2.4 -5.4 -2.4 -0.8 -2.0
Note: Sickness absence is measured in percent. Estimations on subsamples of age groups. Time
period 2008q1-2014q2. Standard errors clustered on municipality. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have analyzed workers’ response to the July 22, 2011 terrorist
attack in Norway. I ﬁnd that the sickness absence rate in municipalities from
which an inhabitant was killed in the attack declined substantially after the attack
took place. The decline was around one quarter of a percentage point, implying
a percent decline of 3.9. In municipalities from which no one was killed in the
40
attack, but that had someone who or experienced it ﬁrst-hand, there was also a
substantial decline, of around 2.5 %.
The estimated eﬀects are highly robust across model speciﬁcations. I investi-
gate several possible underlying mechanisms. I ﬁnd no evidence of explanations
in terms of labor market composition on traditional measures of social capital,
but diﬀerential response between age groups stand out. In particular, the de-
cline in the absence rate for people in their 20’s is twice that for people in other
age groups. This supports the popular notion that young people were particu-
larly impacted by the attack because of belonging to the same generation as the
victims.
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Figure 4: Sickness absence 2008 - 2014 by quarter
Note: Sickness absence rate in percent. The large drop in 2009–2010 was associated
with a severe outbreak of swine ﬂu in 2009, and public attention directed at the high
sickness absence level around the same time because of a proposed reform of a part of
the welfare system (IA-avtalen) (Nossen, 2011; Norwegian Institute of Public Health,
2015). These factors aﬀected the whole country, and are absorbed by time ﬁxed eﬀects
in my regressions.
Figure 5: Home municipalities in the July 22 attack
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Pre-attack diﬀerence in levels
Table (5) shows the results of regressing pre-treatment levels of sickness absence on
future treatment status. As can be seen from the ﬁrst two columns, the diﬀerence in
pre-levels is statistically signiﬁcant, and remains so after controls for municipality
population and density, the two other covariates conspicuously diﬀering between
the groups in Table (1), are added.
However, the large regional diﬀerences in population and population density
that exist in Norway mean that these variables are not necessarily comparable
across the country. One way to take this into account while still allowing for
selection into camp participation based on settlement patterns is to interact pop-
ulation density with ﬁxed eﬀects for each of the 19 counties of the country. The
third column shows the results of letting the coeﬃcient on density diﬀer across
the 19 counties in this way. In the fourth column the same is done also for pop-
ulation. In the latter two speciﬁcations, the group level diﬀerences are no longer
statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that these measure of urbanity indeed underlie
both higher absence levels and selection into the treatment groups, most likely by
capturing ease of travel.
Table 5: Pre-treatment absence levels and future treatment
status.
1 2 3 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se
T1 0.366** 0.458*** 0.219 0.213
(0.148) (0.156) (0.147) (0.163)
T2 0.054 0.085 0.042 0.014
(0.111) (0.121) (0.108) (0.112)
population No Yes No No
density No Yes No No
county-density No No Yes Yes
county-pop No No No Yes
year#quarter f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.070 0.076 0.256 0.285
N 6345 6345 6345 6345
# municipalities 423 423 423 423
depvar mean 6.29 6.29 6.29 6.29
depvar sd 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26
Note: Sickness absence rate in percent. Time period 2008q1-
2011q2. Standard errors clustered at municipality. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 6: Eﬀect on sickness absence by gender. Women (top), men (bottom).
Women Baseline Cov Ind.trends Cov-trends
b/se b/se b/se b/se
T1 -0.242*** -0.237** -0.227* -0.208**
(0.092) (0.094) (0.132) (0.095)
T2 -0.167** -0.162** -0.165 -0.148*
(0.082) (0.082) (0.122) (0.083)
population density No Yes Yes Yes
population No Yes Yes Yes
schoolyears No Yes Yes Yes
health social sector share No Yes Yes Yes
female share of labor force No Yes Yes Yes
population#time trend No No No Yes
pop.density#time trend No No No Yes
Labor party vote#time trend No No No Yes
municipality-speciﬁc time trends No No Yes No
year#quarter f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
municip. f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.118 0.121 0.257 0.123
N 10152 10152 10152 10152
# municipalities 423 423 423 423
depvar mean 7.62 7.62 7.62 7.62
depvar sd 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57
Men Baseline Cov Ind.trends Cov-trends
b/se b/se b/se b/se
T1 -0.244*** -0.243*** -0.184* -0.210***
(0.064) (0.065) (0.097) (0.065)
T2 -0.154** -0.148** -0.053 -0.132**
(0.063) (0.062) (0.092) (0.062)
population density No Yes Yes Yes
population No Yes Yes Yes
schoolyears No Yes Yes Yes
health social sector share No Yes Yes Yes
female share of labor force No Yes Yes Yes
population#time trend No No No Yes
pop.density#time trend No No No Yes
Labor party vote#time trend No No No Yes
municipality-speciﬁc time trends No No Yes No
year#quarter f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
municip. f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.206 0.207 0.329 0.211
N 10152 10151 10151 10151
# municipalities 423 423 423 423
depvar mean 4.89 4.89 4.89 4.89
depvar sd 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29
Note: Separate regressions for women and men. In speciﬁcation with covariate#time
trend, population and population density are measured in 2010, Labor party vote in 2009
election. Time period 2008q1-2013q4. Standard errors clustered at municipality. * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 7: Eﬀects on sickness absence - dynamics
Baseline Cov Ind.trends Cov-trends
b/se b/se b/se b/se
T1, t-3 -0.000 -0.006 0.018 0.008
(0.076) (0.076) (0.091) (0.077)
T1, t-2 -0.000 -0.010 0.029 0.007
(0.083) (0.085) (0.107) (0.083)
T1, t-1 -0.012 -0.022 0.019 -0.002
(0.085) (0.086) (0.126) (0.085)
T1, t -0.021 -0.031 0.012 -0.009
(0.096) (0.096) (0.138) (0.097)
T1, t+1 -0.221*** -0.231*** -0.187 -0.207**
(0.084) (0.085) (0.137) (0.086)
T1, t+2 -0.238*** -0.232*** -0.181 -0.203**
(0.085) (0.087) (0.152) (0.087)
T1, t+3 -0.263*** -0.257*** -0.204 -0.226**
(0.098) (0.098) (0.174) (0.101)
T1, t+4 -0.289*** -0.282*** -0.228 -0.250***
(0.089) (0.090) (0.174) (0.092)
T1, t+5 -0.209** -0.202** -0.146 -0.167*
(0.095) (0.095) (0.192) (0.100)
T1, t+6 -0.267*** -0.273*** -0.195 -0.235**
(0.092) (0.095) (0.198) (0.098)
T1, t+7 -0.238** -0.244** -0.165 -0.204**
(0.093) (0.097) (0.211) (0.100)
T1, t+8 -0.240** -0.246** -0.165 -0.204*
(0.107) (0.110) (0.215) (0.115)
T1, t+9 -0.261*** -0.267*** -0.185 -0.223**
(0.093) (0.095) (0.225) (0.104)
T1, t+10 -0.333*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.087) (.) (.) (.)
T1, t+11 -0.416*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.092) (.) (.) (.)
T2, t-3 -0.027 -0.027 -0.049 -0.020
(0.062) (0.063) (0.073) (0.063)
T2, t-2 0.018 0.017 -0.002 0.025
(0.078) (0.078) (0.095) (0.077)
T2, t-1 -0.055 -0.056 -0.078 -0.047
(0.078) (0.077) (0.102) (0.076)
T2, t -0.068 -0.068 -0.094 -0.058
(0.082) (0.082) (0.110) (0.082)
T2, t+1 -0.065 -0.066 -0.094 -0.054
(0.076) (0.076) (0.113) (0.076)
T2, t+2 -0.111 -0.100 -0.136 -0.087
(0.083) (0.084) (0.128) (0.085)
T2, t+3 -0.146* -0.134* -0.173 -0.121
(0.082) (0.081) (0.140) (0.081)
T2, t+4 -0.215** -0.203** -0.245 -0.188**
(0.090) (0.089) (0.153) (0.089)
T2, t+5 -0.154* -0.142 -0.187 -0.126
(0.089) (0.088) (0.158) (0.089)
T2, t+6 -0.235*** -0.231*** -0.267 -0.215**
(0.084) (0.084) (0.168) (0.085)
T2, t+7 -0.211*** -0.208** -0.247 -0.190**
(0.082) (0.082) (0.174) (0.083)
T2, t+8 -0.185** -0.182* -0.224 -0.163*
(0.094) (0.093) (0.187) (0.096)
T2, t+9 -0.202** -0.198** -0.243 -0.178**
(0.083) (0.083) (0.193) (0.088)
T2, t+10 -0.223*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.085) (.) (.) (.)
T2, t+11 -0.332*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.083) (.) (.) (.)
population density No Yes Yes Yes
population No Yes Yes Yes
schoolyears No Yes Yes Yes
health social sector share No Yes Yes Yes
female share of labor force No Yes Yes Yes
population#time trend No No No Yes
pop.density#time trend No No No Yes
Labor party vote#time trend No No No Yes
municipality-speciﬁc time trends No No Yes No
year#quarter f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
municip. f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.243 0.245 0.380 0.249
N 10998 10152 10152 10152
# municipalities 423 423 423 423
depvar mean 6.07 6.10 6.10 6.10
depvar sd 1.23 1.24 1.24 1.24
Note: Sickness absence in percent. Treatments in one period (quarter) only. Time period
2008q1-2013q4. Standard errors clustered at municipality. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
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Table 8: Eﬀect on sickness absence - weighted regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline exclOslo pop<100000 pop<50000 pop<25000
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
T1 -0.099** -0.131** -0.124** -0.177*** -0.200***
(0.048) (0.053) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059)
T2 -0.099** -0.099** -0.103** -0.103** -0.137***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.048)
year#quarter f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
municip f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.564 0.534 0.510 0.500 0.450
N 10152 10128 10080 10008 9648
# municipalities 423 422 420 417 402
depvar mean 5.90 6.02 6.05 6.16 6.22
depvar sd 1.01 1.02 1.07 1.03 1.05
Note: Weights are number of people employed in 2010. Columns (2)–(5) show estima-
tions on subsamples created by excluding: (2) Oslo, (3) the three largest (Oslo, Bergen,
Trondheim), (4) municipalities with working age population above 50 000, and (5) mu-
nicipalities with working age population of 25 000 or above. Time period 2008q1-2013q4.
Standard errors clustered at municipality. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 9: Eﬀect on sickness absence - by popula-
tion subsamples.
(1) (2)
10000-20000 pop<10000
b/se b/se
T1 -0.217** -0.284**
(0.105) (0.122)
T2 -0.264** -0.108
(0.100) (0.076)
year#quarter f.e. Yes Yes
municip f.e. Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.889 0.670
N 1368 7608
municipalities 57 317
depvar mean 6.27 6.08
depvar sd 1.01 1.31
Note: Sickness absence in percent. Non-weighted
regressions. Columns (1) and (2) show estima-
tions on subsamples of municipalities with working
age population (in 2010) in intervals (10000–20000)
and (0-10000), respectively. Time period 2008q1-
2013q4. Standard errors clustered at municipality.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 10: Eﬀects on log of sickness absence.
Time period 2007q4-2013q3. Standard errors clustered at municipality.
Baseline Cov Ind.trends Cov-trends
b/se b/se b/se b/se
T1 -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.035** -0.030***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011)
T2 -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.024* -0.025**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
population density No Yes Yes Yes
population No Yes Yes Yes
schoolyears No Yes Yes Yes
health social sector share No Yes Yes Yes
female share of labor force No Yes Yes Yes
population#time trend No No No Yes
pop.density#time trend No No No Yes
Labor party vote#time trend No No No Yes
municipality-speciﬁc time trends No No Yes No
year#quarter f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
municip. f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.228 0.231 0.363 0.233
N 10152 10152 10152 10152
# municipalities 423 423 423 423
depvar mean 1.79 1.79 1.79 1.79
depvar sd 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Note: Sickness absence is measured in log of the absence rate. In speciﬁcation with covari-
ate#time trend, population and population density are measured in 2010, Labor party vote
in 2009 election. Time period 2008q1-2013q4. Standard errors clustered at municipality. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 11: Placebo test on an earlier time period
Baseline Cov Ind.trends Cov-trends
b/se b/se b/se b/se
T1 0.007 -0.013 0.019 0.025
(0.073) (0.075) (0.108) (0.079)
T2 -0.017 -0.038 -0.079 -0.013
(0.065) (0.067) (0.095) (0.071)
population density No Yes Yes Yes
population No Yes Yes Yes
schoolyears No Yes Yes Yes
health social sector share No Yes Yes Yes
female share of labor force No Yes Yes Yes
population#time trend No No No Yes
pop.density#time trend No No No Yes
Labor party vote#time trend No No No Yes
municipality-speciﬁc time trends No No Yes No
year#quarter f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
municip. f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.439 0.441 0.539 0.443
N 10152 10152 10152 10152
# municipalities 423 423 423 423
depvar mean 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57
depvar sd 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52
Note: Sickness absence is measured in percent. In speciﬁcation with covariate#time
trend, population, population density, and Labor party vote are measured in 2003. Time
period 2001q1-2007q4. Standard errors clustered at municipality. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01
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Table 12: Eﬀect on disability rate
Baseline Cov Ind.trends Cov-trends
b/se b/se b/se b/se
T1 -0.000 0.020 0.037 -0.050
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041)
T2 -0.026 -0.025 -0.007 -0.070**
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.028)
population density No Yes Yes Yes
population No Yes Yes Yes
schoolyears No Yes Yes Yes
health social sector share No Yes Yes Yes
female share of labor force No Yes Yes Yes
population#time trend No No No Yes
pop.density#time trend No No No Yes
Labor party vote#time trend No No No Yes
municipality-speciﬁc time trends No No Yes No
year#quarter f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
municip. f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.088 0.112 0.125 0.614
N 4653 4653 4653 4653
# municipalities 423 423 423 423
depvar mean 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.07
depvar sd 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10
Note: Disability recipients in percent of population. In speciﬁcation with covari-
ate#time trend, population and population density are measured in 2010, Labor party
vote in 2009 election. Time period 2010q4-2013q4. Standard errors clustered at munic-
ipality. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 13: Eﬀects on labor force participation
Baseline Cov Ind.trends Cov-trends
b/se b/se b/se b/se
T1 0.037 0.001 -0.262 0.139
(0.347) (0.352) (0.530) (0.366)
T2 0.004 0.042 -0.445 0.104
(0.318) (0.314) (0.528) (0.330)
population density No Yes Yes Yes
population No Yes Yes Yes
schoolyears No Yes Yes Yes
health social sector share No Yes Yes Yes
female share of labor force No Yes Yes Yes
population#time trend No No No Yes
pop.density#time trend No No No Yes
Labor party vote#time trend No No No Yes
municipality-speciﬁc time trends No No Yes No
year#quarter f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
municip. f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.384 0.385 0.427 0.386
N 10152 10152 10152 10152
# municipalities 423 423 423 423
depvar mean 61.27 61.27 61.27 61.27
depvar sd 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25
Note: Labor force participation as a percentage of the population. In speciﬁcation with
covariate#time trend, population and population density are measured in 2010, Labor
party vote in 2009 election. Time period 2000-2012, 2011 excluded. Standard errors
clustered at municipality. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 14: Eﬀect on sickness absence – by age group. Excluding municipalities
with some missing observations.
age20-24 age25-29 age30-34 age35-39 age40-44 age45-49 age50-54 age55-59 age60-66
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
T1 -0.473 -0.306 -0.170 -0.276 -0.209 -0.150 -0.191 -0.230 -0.297
(0.118) (0.131) (0.138) (0.124) (0.117) (0.118) (0.119) (0.143) (0.178)
*** ** ** * *
T2 -0.396 -0.403 0.063 -0.038 -0.125 -0.297 -0.099 -0.033 -0.151
(0.106) (0.114) (0.121) (0.123) (0.111) (0.109) (0.119) (0.134) (0.176)
*** *** ***
y-q f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
municip. f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.095 0.074 0.061 0.042 0.047 0.038 0.044 0.045 0.073
N 10827 10773 10908 11205 11340 11286 11313 11313 11313
# municip. 401 399 404 415 420 418 419 419 419
depvar mean 4.28 5.66 6.12 6.00 5.92 5.99 6.38 6.99 8.30
depvar sd 1.90 2.21 2.23 2.10 1.95 1.96 2.13 2.33 2.92
Note: Sickness absence is measured in percent. Estimations on subsamples of age groups. Time
period 2008q1-2014q2. Standard errors clustered on municipality. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
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Chapter III:
Do parents create voting habits in their children?
Evidence from a natural experiment
Øystein M. Hernæs∗
Abstract
I exploit variation among ﬁrst-time voters that arises through voting
eligibility rules and two-year election cycles to estimate the eﬀects of ﬁrst-
time voting environment on turnout in Norwegian elections. I ﬁnd that
obtaining the right to vote at a lower age is associated with substantially
higher turnout among ﬁrst-time voters, and that this is driven by parental
inﬂuence. Counter to conventional wisdom about the habitual nature of
voting, this diﬀerence in political participation does not persist for subse-
quent elections.
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1 Introduction
Do parents create voting habits in their children?
In many countries, there is an ongoing debate about what the legal voting
age should be.1The question is usually whether to lower the age requirement
from 18 to 16 years. In the Norwegian case, the explicitly stated key objective for
lowering the requirement is to increase the political participation of young people,
in both the short and the long run, and it is believed that lowering the voting
age will accomplish this (Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Regional
Development, 2008). This is actually an evidence-based view, based on research
about habit-formation in voting and the assumption that it will be feasible to
channel young people into actually participating (Norwegian Ministry of Local
Government and Regional Development (2006, pp. 43–44), Norwegian Ministry
of Local Government and Regional Development (2008, pp. 54–55)). Another
objective is to have a larger share of the population represented politically.
This paper investigates the eﬀects of voting for the ﬁrst time when being
relatively young, and sheds light on the mechanisms behind individual voting
behavior.
The methodology is to exploit variation in ﬁrst-time voting environment that
arises through voting eligibility rules and two-year election cycles, which lead
ﬁrst-time voters to come from two clearly separated cohorts – those that turn 18
years old in the election year and those that turn 19. Age trends for the two types
are depicted in Figure 1. I analyze ﬁrst what causes the large discrepancy between
the two leftmost data points, second whether there is a diﬀerence between the
rest of the two turnout proﬁles.
I ﬁnd that among ﬁrst-time voters, the youngest cohort has higher turnout,
and that this is driven by the inﬂuence of parents. However, in the long run,
no trace remains of this initial diﬀerence. This suggests that the source of one’s
turnout decision matters for habit formation in political participation, and that
lowering the voting age is no panacea for inducing higher turnout.
1For instance in Austria, Germany, Ireland, the Nordic countries, UK, US (Council of Eu-
rope, 2011).
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Figure 1: Average turnout by cohort. “young” were able to vote for the ﬁrst time
in the year they turned 18, “old” in the year they turned 19. Age obtained in
the election year on the horizontal axis.
2 Literature
Voting behavior has been widely studied, but identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects has
been a challenge. The contributions most closely related come from the strand
of literature that investigates voting habits. Franklin (2004) claims that the
extension of the franchise by lowering the voting age from 21 to 18 years in the
US lead to a ﬁrst-time voting situation that was less conducive to acquiring a
habit of voting, and that the result was many life-long non-voters.
Meredith (2009) compares the voting behavior of individuals who were just
eligible to vote in a previous election and individuals who fell just short of being
eligible. Eligibility increases subsequent turnout and to some extent the likeli-
hoods both of being aﬃliated with a party and of this party being the Democrats.
The data come from the California Statewide Voter File, which contains infor-
mation of all registered voters in the state of California. Relatedly, Dinas (2012)
exploits the fact that in the 1968 US presidential election, the voting eligibility
requirement was to have turned 21 years old on election day. Using survey data,
he ﬁnds that those that were just eligible in the 1968 election have a substantially
higher propensity to vote in the 1970 and 1972 elections than those not eligible
in 1968. These studies compare individuals who are of essentially the same age
but become eligible at diﬀerent points in time, whereas I compare people that
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are of diﬀerent ages, but become eligible at the same point in time. Further,
in Meredith (2009) and Dinas (2012) ’s studies, those that are compared always
diﬀer in the number of elections they have been eligible to participate in, whereas
in my study, individuals that are compared have participated in the same num-
ber of elections, but diﬀer in one year of age and thereby in the character of the
previous election experience.
Denny and Doyle (2009) take individual persistence in turnout as given, and
investigate whether the persistence is due to individual characteristics or habits.
The data used is from a British child development study, which contains informa-
tion on respondents’ turnout in three elections as well as many other factors. The
authors use residential mobility between the ages of 16 and 23 as an instrumental
variable that has a (negative) eﬀect on turnout when the individual is in that
age range, but no direct eﬀect on later turnout. They estimate that everything
else being equal, an individual who voted in one election is 13 percentage points
more likely to vote in the next election.
Experimental work by Gerber et al. (2003) shows that people randomly urged
to vote were more likely to vote in both the upcoming and the subsequent election.
The authors use the experimental treatments as instrumental variables, and ﬁnd
substantial 2SLS estimates of voting in one election on the probability of voting
in the subsequent election.
A compelling recent study by Fujiwara et al. (2013) estimate habit formation
by exploiting the fact that rainfall on election day reduces turnout. Employing
county-level data on US presidential elections 1952-2012, they use lagged precip-
itation as an instrument for lagged turnout, and estimate that a 1-percentage
point decrease in turnout reduces turnout in the next election by as much as
0.7-0.9 percentage points.
Overall, the studies with credible identiﬁcation strategies tend to ﬁnd sub-
stantial eﬀects of voting in one election on voting in the next election. This has
provided a rationale for policy-makers for lowering the age limit in order to coun-
teract declining turnout trends, since young people would then be “pulled into”
voting and start developing the “habit of voting” earlier.
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3 Data
After every Norwegian election, Statistics Norway initiates a survey of the elec-
torate by means of a representative sample. A (stratiﬁed) sample of around 4000
people between the ages of 17 and 80 years is drawn. The election councils in the
municipalities then check in the electoral rolls whether these persons voted, after
which it is attempted to undertake an extensive interview, lasting approximately
one hour, with everyone in the sample.
These surveys have been carried out after all parliamentary elections since
1957 and local elections since 1995. Unfortunately, only some of the surveys
contain information on the year of birth of an individual (as opposed to age at
the time of the interview), which is essential for my purposes. For parliamentary
elections, information about year of birth is available for 1993, 1997 and 2009;
for local elections, information about year of birth is available for 1995, 1999 and
2003.
The gross sample consists of all individuals drawn by Statistics Norway. An
advantage with the gross sample is that there is no selection into or out of it.
Individuals from gross samples make up 70 % of my ﬁnal ﬁle. For some of the
elections, it is only the net sample that is available. The net sample consists of
those that accept to be interviewed. It contains information that may be used to
control for variables that are known to be important for turnout as well as other
political variables. The survey is undertaken as a rolling panel, where half the
initial gross sample in one survey is retained from the previous survey. Because of
the rolling panel structure, the data is potentially plagued by an observer eﬀect,
as being interviewed about one election may aﬀect behavior related to the next
election. I deal with this by excluding all second-time participants from the net
samples.
The combined ﬁle contains 6683 ﬁrst-time survey participants born after 1959.
The reason for the age cut-oﬀ is that before 1978 the voting age was 20 years,
thus I use only those born in 1960 or later, as there may be diﬀerent eﬀects at
play in 18 vs. 19 year-olds than in 20 vs. 21 year-olds.
Summary statistics are presented in table (1). The variables that are observed
for everyone in the sample are voted, age, female, and election year. Answers
to the interview questions are not observed for all participants, because questions
have varied somewhat from year to year and because the table contains data from
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both the gross and the net samples.
voted, female and in school are coded as dummy variables. education is in
three levels – completed less than high school, completed high school, or com-
pleted tertiary education. The answers to the rest of the interview questions
are originally in four levels, but recoded to a 0-1 scale for ease of interpretation.
The ﬁrst column contains all voters, the second only ﬁrst-time voters, i.e. those
aged 18 or 19 in the election year, while the ﬁnal two columns break down the
ﬁrst-time voters further into 18- and 19-year olds.
As a preview of some of the later analysis, we may note the gap in turnout
between the two groups of ﬁrst-time voters displayed in the ﬁrst row (in the two
ﬁnal columns) – those aged 18 voted almost 20 percentage points more than their
one year older ﬁrst-time voting peers. This is somewhat puzzling, in light of the
well-established positive relationship between age and turnout (Wolﬁnger and
Rosenstone, 1980). A natural follow-up question is whether this might be related
to the other large discrepancy between the groups – the fact that 18 year-olds
are in school 21 percentage points more. I will answer this in the negative below.
4 Empirical strategy
Turnout is usually seen as depending on a host of factors, such as education,
income, beneﬁt of election outcome, cost of voting, information, civic duty, and
so on. I consider a margin that cuts across most of these factors, in particular –
I analyze the eﬀect of age at ﬁrst election, both in that ﬁrst election and in later
elections.
I exploit the variation in voting age that arises through the two-year election
cycles. In most countries the requirement for voting is to be at least 18 years old
on the day of the election. In Norway, however, the requirement is to become 18
years old in the year of the election. Since elections take place in the fall every
second year, a person can be anywhere between 17 years and 8 months (born
December 31) and 19 years and 8 months (born January 1) the ﬁrst time he or
she has the opportunity to vote.
An advantage of the requirement of turning 18 years old in the year of the
election is that any variation related to time of the year at which an individual
is born can be ignored since both groups of comparison consist of people born
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
All First time voters
voters Pooled age 18 age 19
voted 0.65 0.56 0.65 0.46
age 29.94 18.47 18.00 19.00
female 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.48
interview questions
in school 0.24 0.59 0.68 0.47
education (in 3) 2.07 1.91 1.86 1.97
civic duty to vote 0.80 0.68 0.67 0.70
interest 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.51
discussed election 0.55 0.52 0.56 0.46
trust local politicians 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.46
trust national politic. 0.49 0.54 0.52 0.57
trust people 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.48
work hours 0.57 0.24 0.25 0.23
election year
1993 0.07 0.13 0.15 0.11
1995 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.17
1997 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.17
1999 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.14
2003 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.21
2009 0.25 0.19 0.17 0.20
N 6683 650 343 307
Note: Means shown. Data from election surveys. voted,
female and in school are coded as dummy variables. education
is in three levels – completed less than high school, completed
high school, or completed tertiary education. The answers to
the rest of the interview questions are originally in four levels,
but recoded to a 0-1 scale for ease of interpretation.
throughout the year and. Any time-of-the-year eﬀects thus cancel out within
cohorts.
I do not observe anyone more than once, but by knowing their year of birth
I know how old they were in the year when they obtained the opportunity to
vote for the ﬁrst time. Since elections take place in odd years, it will simply be
the case that those born in an odd year obtained the opportunity to vote for the
ﬁrst time in the year they turned 18, while those born in an even year obtained
the opportunity the year they turned 19. I analyze whether the voting behavior
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of these two groups diﬀer, ﬁrst only for ﬁrst-time voters, secondly for all other
voters.
I estimate the following linear probability model:
vi = α + βY OUNGi + xiγ + i (1)
vi is equal to 1 if the individual voted, 0 otherwise. Y OUNGi is equal to 1 if the
individual was eligible to vote in the year of turning 18 years old, 0 otherwise (in
which case the individual was ﬁrst eligible in the year of turning 19 years old).
xi denotes gender and the election year the individual was observed. i is the
disturbance term.
When analyzing only ﬁrst-time-voters, I clearly cannot include any type of
age eﬀect, as this would be perfectly collinear with the Y OUNG-dummy. When
estimating eﬀects on non-ﬁrst-time-voters, however, xi also includes a cubic func-
tion in age. In that case, two adjacent cohorts will diﬀer in the same way in the
early eligibility indicator Y OUNGi and age. The identifying assumption is that
the age eﬀect can be accounted for by controlling ﬂexibly for age in the estima-
tion. Period eﬀects should cancel out through the treatment taking place every
other year.
Whether to vote or not is a binary choice. The linear probability model is
reasonable here, as I am interested in the partial eﬀect of early eligibility averaged
over the other covariates, not at particular values, and the covariates are mostly
discrete. I use robust standard errors because of heteroskedasticity arising from
the binary dependent variable.
5 Results
5.1 First-time voters
Table (2) shows the result of regressing the voting dummy on whether an individ-
ual was eligible at 18 years old or not including only ﬁrst-time voters. The ﬁrst
column contains all ﬁrst-time voters in the sample. In average 18-year olds have
a turnout that is almost 20 percentage points higher than that of the 19-year
olds. The rest of this subsection investigates the mechanism behind this ﬁnding.
The second and third columns in table (2) restrict the sample to those inter-
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view surveys in which there was a question of whether an individual was currently
attending school. Thus we might test the hypothesis that the cohort diﬀerence
is due to the 18-year olds being in school, where they through the curriculum or
by teachers might be exposed more to the election and politics. From the second
column we see that there is a substantial diﬀerence between the cohorts also in
this sample. Although being in school is positively related to turnout, as can
be seen in the third column, the estimated coeﬃcient on the eligibility dummy
changes very little when including this information. Thus the reason 18-year olds
have higher turnout than 19-year olds is not because they are in school.
Table 2: Turnout-diﬀerences among ﬁrst-
time voters
(1) (2) (3)
b/se b/se b/se
YOUNG 0.192*** 0.271*** 0.254***
(0.038) (0.066) (0.069)
In school 0.073
(0.073)
ymean 0.56 0.54 0.54
R-sqr 0.083 0.078 0.083
N 650 218 218
Note: All models include gender and election
year ﬁxed eﬀects and robust standard errors.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
In Norway everyone can vote freely from anywhere, so the hypothesis that the
results are due to it being more costly to vote if one has moved to another region
and that the 19 year olds have done so to a greater extent can also be discarded
(Government.no, 2015).
Another likely explanation for the diﬀerence between the two cohorts of ﬁrst-
time voters is that younger voters more often live at home and thus may be
inﬂuenced to vote by their parents. This inﬂuence can take many forms, like
social or conformity pressure, interest-inducing exposure, and practical reasons.
Such an explanation is supported by a study on Danish ﬁrst-time voters: Bhatti
and Hansen (2012) use massive amounts of observational data and ﬁnd a strong
association between living with parents and turnout, even while controlling for a
wide range of socioeconomic variables, including ongoing and completed educa-
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tion, previous moving patterns, gender, marriage status, school grades, income,
ethnicity, citizenship, and parents’ age, education and income.
Unfortunately, there is no question in the Norwegian election surveys about
where a respondent is living. I therefore use information from a separate living
condition survey to assess this mechanism. The living conditions survey have
information about young people’s turnout and whether people were living with
their parents for the 1997 and 2005 waves.
Table (3) shows the result of running the same regressions as before using
only data on ﬁrst-time voters from the living conditions surveys. The ﬁrst col-
umn shows that we ﬁnd the same pattern among 18 and 19 year olds as in the
election surveys, here with the 18 year olds in average voting 25 percentage points
more. This diﬀerence is substantially reduced when including information about
whether an individual lived with his or her parents, as can be seen in column (2).
The two ﬁnal columns conﬁrm the importance for turnout of living with one’s
parents as opposed to being in school.
It appears that what is driving the results is the fact that the 18 year olds to
a greater extent live with their parents.
Table 3: Testing the living-with-parents hypothesis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
YOUNG 0.253* 0.132 0.230 0.100
(0.137) (0.134) (0.144) (0.139)
Living with parents 0.334*** 0.340***
(0.102) (0.101)
In school 0.068 0.091
(0.110) (0.103)
ymean 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
R-sqr 0.050 0.146 0.055 0.154
N 101 101 101 101
Note: Data from living conditions survey. All models include gen-
der and year ﬁxed eﬀects and robust standard errors.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
To investigate the mechanism in more detail, I return to data from the election
surveys to analyze eﬀects on other political variables. Table (4) shows the results
from regressing six other political variables on the eligibility dummy YOUNG.
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The six political variables are whether voting is considered a civic duty (duty),
degree of political interest (interest), how much the respondent discussed the
election (discussed), and degree of trust at three diﬀerent political levels (trust1-
trust3 ), all coded on a scale between 0 and 1.
The results show that for these measures, the only signiﬁcant diﬀerence be-
tween the cohorts is the extent to which they discussed the election, with the
younger voters having discussed the election substantially more. Although the
statistical uncertainty is considerable here, these results suggest that parental
inﬂuence works through social pressure or imitation rather than increasing the
oﬀspring’s intrinsic motivation to vote.
Table 4: Testing the channel of inﬂuence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
duty interest discussed trust1 trust2 trust3
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
YOUNG -0.033 0.032 0.120*** -0.034 -0.055 -0.017
(0.095) (0.025) (0.037) (0.039) (0.046) (0.047)
ymean 0.68 0.51 0.53 0.45 0.54 0.41
R-sqr 0.001 0.005 0.040 0.007 0.014 0.001
N 103 367 259 106 107 148
Note: Data from election surveys. The dependent variables measure (1)
whether voting is considered a civic duty (duty), (2) degree of political
interest (interest), (3) how much the respondent discussed the election (dis-
cussed), (4) degree of trust in politicians at the local level (trust1 ), (5) de-
gree of trust in politicians and the national level (trust2 ), and (6) whether
most people are trustworthy (trust3 ), all coded on a scale between 0 and
1. All models control for gender and year ﬁxed eﬀects and robust standard
errors.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
To sum up, among the two cohorts of ﬁrst-time voters, the youngest vote in
elections substantially more frequently than the older ones, and this diﬀerence
seems to be driven by the inﬂuence of parents. The next subsection investigates
whether the cohort diﬀerence found for ﬁrst-time voters is present also later in
life.
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5.2 Subsequent eﬀects
So far I have demonstrated that early eligibility substantially increases turnout
among ﬁrst-time voters and that this is driven by parental inﬂuence. As persis-
tence estimates in the literature are quite high – Gerber et al. (2003) ﬁnd that
a 1 percentage point increase in turnout increases turnout in the next election
by 0.5 percentage points, and Fujiwara et al. (2013) ﬁnd an even higher eﬀect of
between 0.7 and 0.9 percentage points in the next election – one would expect
the cohort diﬀerence to persist also for future elections. As we will se below, this
is not so.
Table (5) below shows the estimates of the average subsequent marginal eﬀect
of early eligibility. The results for ﬁrst-time voters are provided as a reference
in column (1), but ﬁrst-time voters are left out when estimating the long-term
eﬀects, as I am here interested in the average long-term eﬀects of being a young
ﬁrst-time voter and do not want to mix this up with what goes on in voters’ ﬁrst
election. The second column includes a third degree polynomial in age to control
ﬂexibly for the age-on-voting proﬁle. The estimate is very precisely close to 0. The
third speciﬁcation compares cohorts with the same election experience directly
by including ﬁxed eﬀects for the number of elections for which an individual has
been eligible to vote. Here the coeﬃcient on early eligibility is slightly negative,
as the YOUNG dummy is picking up the well-known long-term age gradient in
turnout.
As an alternative to looking at the average over all later elections, one may
analyze turnout in each cohort pair separately, i.e. the pairs formed by cohorts
who have been eligible to vote the same number of times. Table (6) in the
appendix shows the result of taking the speciﬁcation with an individual’s election
experience, i.e. the number of times he or she has been eligible to go to the polls,
from column (3) above, but now interacting the eligibility dummy YOUNG with
ﬁxed eﬀects for election experience. Already in voters’ second election, when the
eﬀect from the previous election would presumably be the strongest, the point
estimate is close to 0. Later on the estimated coeﬃcient on the interaction term
is at times signiﬁcantly negative, again likely because this is a period in the life
where turnout is steadily increasing, and the cohort who could vote early in their
ﬁrst election will always be younger than the comparison cohort.
The linear probability model does not restrict the outcome to lie within the
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Table 5: Subsequent eﬀect of early eligibility on turnout
First time voters All other voters
(1) (2) (3)
b/se b/se b/se
YOUNG 0.192*** -0.009 -0.024*
(0.038) (0.012) (0.012)
age (cubic) No Yes No
election experience f.e. No No Yes
ymean 0.56 0.66 0.66
R-sqr 0.083 0.086 0.089
N 650 6033 6033
Note: Data from election surveys. All models include gender and
election year ﬁxed eﬀects. “election experience” denotes number of
times a voter has been eligible to vote. Robust standard errors.
First-time voters excluded in columns (2)-(3).
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
unit interval, however it is reassuring to note that predicted turnout is never
below 0, and in only one case does it exceed 1, in which case it is 1.02.
To conclude, I ﬁnd no signs that the early high-turnout behavior induced by
parents persists into adulthood. Perhaps this is not surprising, in light of the
ﬁnding that the parental inﬂuence did not work through the young’s intrinsic
motivation.
5.3 Implications of lowering the voting age: Turnout, Rep-
resentation, Information
Although voting at a lower age leads to higher turnout among ﬁrst-time voters,
it has no eﬀect for older voters. Thus lowering the voting age should not be
regarded as a panacea for increasing long term turnout, even though it may lead
to high youth turnout. This ﬁnding may suggest that voting is only habit-forming
if it is construed as truly self-chosen by the individual.
An eﬀect a lower voting age undoubtedly will have is to increase the relative
representation of young people. The information value of the election may de-
crease or increase, depending on what one believes about the how well informed
young voters are. Two additional cohorts would be voting, and to a relatively
large extent, but some are afraid that these young voters would be less knowl-
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edgeable and only contribute noise. A more optimistic view is that young voters
also contribute information, in which case the information value of the election
would improve.
Two caveats should be noted: dynamics may not be identical for younger
voters, and it may be the case that a high turnout twice when young has long
term eﬀects.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I have used a natural experiment created by voting requirement
rules by year of birth combined with two-year election cycles to analyze the eﬀect
of ﬁrst-time voting environment on turnout.
I ﬁnd that being eligible to vote for the ﬁrst time at a lower age is associated
with higher turnout in one’s ﬁrst election because of parental inﬂuence. However,
despite previous ﬁndings of high persistence in political participation, those who
were eligible to vote for the ﬁrst time at a lower age do not display higher turnout
in subsequent elections, thus demonstrating that the source of earlier political
participation is important.
The results imply that lowering the voting age requirements should not be
regarded as a panacea for increasing turnout in the long run, and suggest that
the concept of autonomy should be taken seriously by parents and policy makers
alike when trying to inﬂuence the political behavior of young people.
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Table 6: Subsequent eﬀect–interaction with
election experience
All
b se
2.elexp#YOUNG -0.008 (0.040)
3.elexp#YOUNG 0.040 (0.045)
4.elexp#YOUNG 0.006 (0.044)
5.elexp#YOUNG -0.088* (0.041)
6.elexp#YOUNG -0.095* (0.040)
7.elexp#YOUNG -0.086* (0.039)
8.elexp#YOUNG 0.022 (0.037)
9.elexp#YOUNG -0.061 (0.036)
10.elexp#YOUNG -0.052 (0.038)
11.elexp#YOUNG 0.021 (0.045)
12.elexp#YOUNG 0.101 (0.054)
13.elexp#YOUNG -0.047 (0.056)
14.elexp#YOUNG 0.074 (0.075)
15.elexp#YOUNG -0.040 (0.069)
16.elexp#YOUNG 0.007 (0.079)
election experience f.e. Yes
ymean 0.66
R-sqr 0.092
N 6033
Note: Data from election surveys. All models
control gender and year ﬁxed eﬀects and robust
standard errors. “election experience” denotes
number of times a voter has been eligible to
vote. First-time voters excluded.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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